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RECOGNIZING THE FULL SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO TAKE
FISH UNDER THE STEVENS TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF




In 1854 and 1855, the United States executed nine treaties with twenty-three
tribes and confederations of tribes and bands indigenous to the Columbia Basin
and northwestern Washington.' Under the treaties, which are identical in all
essential elements, the tribal groups ceded approximately sixty-four million
acres of land to the United States.2 As consideration for these cessions, the
tribes reserved to themselves small reservations within their traditional
territories, the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams and rivers flowing
through or bordering these reservations, and the right of taking fish "in common
with" non-Indians at off-reservation "usual and accustomed" fishing sites.3 The
tribes also reserved rights to erect buildings for curing fish at these off-
reservation sites, and to hunt, gather foods, and pasture stock on unclaimed
lands.4
* President, Spencer Creek Consulting, Eugene, Or. J.D., 2006, Willamette University
College of Law; Ph.D., University of Oregon; B.A. Whitman College. The author may be
contacted at spencercreekconsulting@yahoo.com
I. Treaty with the Walla Walla, Cayuse, Etc., June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the
Tribes of Middle Oregon, June 25, 1855, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Yakima, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat. 951; Treaty with the Nez Perces, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Makah,
Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc., Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat.
1132; Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty with the S'Klallam, Jan. 26,
1855, 12 Stat. 933; Treaty with the Quinaielt, Etc., Jul. 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971. The lead
negotiators for the United States were Washington Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens and
Washington Territorial Superintendent of Indian Affairs Joel Palmer. The treaties are known
collectively as the Stevens Treaties.
2. Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat
Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A PropertyRights Approach, 69 U. COLo. L. REv. 407,426
(1998).
3. See Treaty with the Walla Walla, Cayuse, Etc., art. 1, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the
Tribes of Middle Oregon, art. 1, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Yakima, art. 3, 12 Stat. 951;
Treaty with the Nez Perces, art. 3, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc., art.
3, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty with the Makah, art. 4, 12 Stat. 939.
4. Treaty with the Walla Walla, Cayuse, Etc., art. 1, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the Tribes
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From the tribes' standpoint, the clauses reserving the tribes' rights to take
fish at customary off-reservation fishing sites are the most valuable provisions
in the treaties.5 They arealso the most heavily litigated treaty clauses in the
entire record of treaties between the United States and indigenous peoples,
having been litigated seven times before the United States Supreme Court6 and
countless times before lower courts. The fishing clauses provide that "[t]he
right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed stations, is further secured to
said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory. ..."'
This article traces the history of Northwest fishing rights litigation, and
argues that the fishing clauses impliedly reserve three essential fishery rights to
the tribes: 1) a right of access by tribe members to customary off-reservation
fishing sites; 2) a right to up to fifty percent of harvestable fish8 that pass or are
destined to pass these fishing sites; and 3) a right to healthy spawning, rearing,
and migratory habitats for fish runs that spawn upstream of tribal fishing sites.
of Middle Oregon, art. 1, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the Yakima, art. 3, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty with
the Nez Perces, art. 3, 12 Stat. 957; Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc., art. 3, 10 Stat.
1132; Treaty with the Makah, art. 4, 12 Stat. 939.
5. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRIBAL FISH COMM'N, WY-KAN-USH-MI WA-KISH-WIT: THE
COLUMBIA RIVER ANADROMOUS FISH RESTORATION PLAN OF THE NEZ PERCE, UMATILLA,
WARM SPRINGS, AND YAKAMA TRIBES 2 (1995), available at http://www.critfc.org/oldsite/text/
TRPleg.htm; 0. Yale Lewis III, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat Right as Part of the Trinity
of Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 281,
289 (2002-2003).
6. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Seufert Bros. v. United States, 249 U.S.
194 (1919); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681(1942); Puyallup Tribe v. Wash. Dep't ofGame
(Puyallup I), 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Wash. Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414
U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Wash. Dep't of Game (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165 (1977);
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
7. Treaty with the Yakima, art. 3, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty with the Nez Perces, art. 3, 12 Stat.
957; Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc., art. 3, 10 Stat. 1132. Some of the treaties provide
that the tribes will share off-reservation fishing rights "in common with citizens of the
Territory;" others provide that the tribes will share off-reservation fishing rights "in common
with citizens of the United States". See, e.g., Treaty with the Walla Walla, Cayuse, Etc., art.
1, 12 Stat. 945; Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, art. 1, 12 Stat. 963; Treaty with the
Makah, art. 4, 12 Stat. 939.
8. The number of harvestable fish in a fish run is the total number in the run minus the
number needed for escapement to ensure propagation ofthe next generation. Sohappy v. Smith,
302 F. Supp. 899, 910 (D. Or. 1969) ("In establishing the escapement goal for a particular run
the Fish Commission and its biological staff consider the losses which will occur above the
escapement goal point from all causes, including natural causes, losses at dams and the sports
catch on the upstream and tributaries in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. All the estimated
numbers of fish in a given run in excess of the escapement goal are regarded by the Fish
Commission as harvestable.").
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/2
No. 1] FISHING RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 43
These rights correlate with three essential responsibilities assumed by the
United States through the treaties, and by Washington and Oregon as successors
to United States treaty obligations: 1) a responsibility to safeguard tribe
members' access to customary off-reservation fishing sites; 2) a responsibility
to ensure that fifty percent of harvestable fish destined each fishing season to
pass through tribal fishing sites will actually reach those sites and be available
for tribal harvest; and 3) a responsibility to protect, and, where necessary, to
restore, the spawning, rearing, and migratory habitats of fish runs returning to
tribal fishing grounds.
These rights and responsibilities are incorporated within the fishing clauses
by implication. There is no evidence that either tribal or United States
negotiators considered the possibility at treaty time that the region's
anadromous fisheries might collapse, and it is doubtful that any of the parties
sought by means of the treaties to guard against such an occurrence. Because
of the abundance of salmon, sturgeon, and lamprey that migrated annually
through the region's rivers and streams, and because at treaty time technologies
for exploiting the resource did not yet exist, treaty parties probably never
imagined that the region's fisheries could be destroyed by human acts. Of each
of the three reciprocal rights and responsibilities implicit in the treaties, it would
be safe to assume that only the first - the right of access to customary fishing
sites and the responsibility of assuring that access - could have been
considered in jeopardy when the treaties were negotiated and signed. If the
treaties are interpreted as safeguarding only those rights realistically seen as
threatened at treaty time, then the fishing clauses would probably have to be
read as reserving to the tribes nothing more than bare rights of access to their
fishing sites.
However, the fishing clauses cannot reasonably be so narrowly construed.
The clauses were intended to protect much more thanjust tribe members' rights
to attempt to catch fish - to "go fishing" - at customary fishing sites.
Applying standard canons of treaty construction, the fishing clauses should be
interpreted as safeguarding a broad constellation of fishery-related tribal
interests and values. This constellation, or web, of fishery-related interests and
values includes an interest in an equitable share of each season's harvest as well
as an interest in healthy spawning, rearing, and migratory habitats for fish runs
passing through tribal fishing grounds. Although the parties could not have
foreseen the destruction of the region's fisheries by dams, logging,
development, pollution, and other human acts, the tribes clearly expected, and
the United States clearly promised, that the treaties would protect the fishery as
a whole from human-caused destruction, not merely certain discreet aspects of
it. All parties would have expected that in the event of harm to treaty fisheries
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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through government-sponsored or government-authorized actions, the United
States and successor state governments would have an obligation to remedy that
harm.
This article follows, in chronological order, the courts' painstaking efforts
to reconstruct and apply the meaning of the fishing clauses with respect to the
tribes' asserted rights of access, allocation, and fisheries habitat conservation
and restoration. Part II examines the three cases - United States v. Taylor,9
United States v. Winans,' and Seufert Brothers Co. v. United States" - that
affirmed the tribes' rights to cross over and use lands encompassing their
customary fishing sites. Part III discusses two landmark rulings - Sohappy v.
Smith'2 and United States v. Washington3 - that established the tribes' rights
to a fair allocation of harvestable treaty-area salmon. Part IV covers a series of
cases dealing with the power of federal courts to enforce the allocation orders
handed down in Sohappy v. Smith 14 and United States v. Washington.15 The
cases in Part IV confirm that federal district courts have authority to supervise
treaty-area fisheries management for the purpose of enforcing treaty-reserved
rights. Part V discusses the issue that was litigated in Phase II of United States
v. Washington but was never resolved: whether the right to take fish
incorporates a right to have fishery habitats protected from human-caused
environmental degradation.
I. Access to Customary Fishing Sites: Taylor,16 Winans, " and Seufert8
Litigation over the meaning of the fishing clauses originated in a case
brought in 1884 in the Territory of Washington, involving several members of
the Yakama nation and a non-Indian property owner named Frank Taylor.' 9
Taylor, whose property abutted the Columbia River, had built a fence around
his land which prevented Yakama fishers from reaching one of their customary
fishing sites.2° The fishers brought suit in the District Court of the Fourth
9. 13 P. 333 (Wash. 1887).
10. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
11. 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
12. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
13. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
14. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
15. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
16, United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333 (Wash. 1887).
17. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
18. Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
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Judicial District of the Territory of Washington, seeking an injunction to have
the fence removed."' After losing in the lower court, the fishers appealed to the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington. Surprisingly, the court ruled
in their favor.22
As framed by the court, the issue was whether the fishers' treaty rights of
access to their fishing sites were superior to Taylor's right, as fee simple owner,
to exclude them from his land.23 Taylor argued that the treaty was a grant of
limited rights to the Yakama, and that these rights could not be construed as
including a broad right of access to customary fishing sites, because any place
might in the future become a customary fishing site and this would imply,
reductio ad absurdum, that the treaty could eventually impose a servitude along
the entire river.24 Taylor contended further that even if the treaty was liberally
interpreted as having once given treaty fishers the right to cross over lands
ceded by the tribes to the United States, this right no longer applied to the land
in question because this land had passed into private hands through acts of
Congress taken subsequent to the execution of the treaty.25 Yakama treaty
rights were no longer valid against his land, Taylor argued, because they were
superceded by the homestead and pre-emption acts that authorized conveyance
of that land by the federal government.26
The court rejected each of Taylor's arguments. Applying standard canons
of treaty construction, it held first that the treaty with the Yakama effected a
reservation of rights by the Yakama Nation and its members, not a granting of
rights to them by the United States:
The appellants contend that this clause was a reservation ... of
certain rights therein specified, while the appellee insists that it
should be construed as a specific grant of rights by the United
States. We think the contention of the appellants must prevail, as it
seems to us that the Indians, in making the treaty, would have been
more likely to have intended to grant only such rights as they were
to part with, rather than to have conveyed all, with the
understanding that certain were to be at once reconveyed to them.
21. Id. at 333-34.
22. Id. at 336.
23. Id. at 334.
24. Id. at 335.
25. Id. at 335-36.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 335.
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Rejecting Taylor's other contentions, the Court held that the fishing clause
reserved to the Yakama a right of access, not to the entire riverfront, but to
"certain ancient fisheries which had for generations been used as such," and that
the tribe's right to use these fisheries survived conveyance of ceded lands from
the federal government to private parties.2" On this last point, the Court
concluded that laws such as the Homestead Act "only authorize the
extinguishment of the title which the government holds at the time of the
appropriation; and, if the land selected by the settler has at such time any
servitude or easement impressed upon it [the settler] takes subject thereto."29
From the standpoint of non-Indian property owners along waterways
containing treaty Indian fishing sites in Washington Territory, the outcome of
UnitedStates v. Taylor must have been startling. One implication of the court's
holding is that lands abutting customary Indian fishing sites in territories ceded
by tribes through treaties were suddenly found subject to an easement which
had not been recognized before. It did not matter to the court that ownership
of these lands had been transferred into private hands before the easement had
been recognized.
Despite the Taylor ruling, the tribes' right of access to customary fishing
sites was routinely denied by landowners and state officials in subsequent
decades. When Washington was granted statehood in 1889, Frank Taylor's
son, who had inherited his father's property, erected a new fence and argued
that the new Circuit Court for the District of Washington was not a successor
court; therefore, the court did not have authority to punish him for violating the
territorial court's injunction.30 0. D. Taylor lost the argument, 31 but other
owners of property abutting traditional fishing sites continued to assert a right
to bar treaty fishers from crossing or using their lands.
Within twelve years, the Yakama found themselves back in court to request
another injunction, in United States v. Winans.32 Salmon barons, Lineas and
Audubon Winans, owned land along the Washington side of the Columbia
River, where they operated several fish wheels under license from the state at
sites traditionally used by Yakama fishers. 3  The fish wheels monopolized the
river channel and prevented Yakama fishers from using their customary fishing
28. Id.
29. Id. at 336.
30. United States v. Taylor, 44 F. 2, 3 (C.C.S.D. Wash. 1890).
31. Id. at 4. The new circuit court held that it was a proper successor and was required to
adopt all rulings and orders of the Territorial Court.
32. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
33. Id. at 379.
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sites.34 Joined by the United States as trustee for the Yakama tribe, Yakama
fishers filed suit to enjoin the Winanses' fish wheel operation.35 The circuit
court refused to grant the injunction.36 Overruling the precedent set in Taylor,
it held that the treaty with the Yakama did not require private property owners
to give access and use rights to Yakama fishers. The court accepted the
property owners' argument that the treaty gave tribe members only as much
right of access as that possessed by non-Indian members of the general public.
The Indians are at the present time on an equal footing with the
citizens of the United States who have not acquired exclusive
proprietary rights, and this it seems to me is all that they can legally
demand with respect to fishing privileges in waters outside the limits
of Indian reservations under the terms of their treaty with the United
States.37
The Yakama appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Winanses
repeated the argument they had made to the circuit court, contending that under
the key words of the fishing clause - "in common with the citizens of the
Territory" - the Yakama reserved no more rights to the fishery than those held
by non-Indian fishers.38 When the lands were part of the public domain, they
argued, the Yakama had a right of access to fishing sites in common with other
citizens.39 Conveyance of the lands to private parties, however, extinguished
these rights just as completely as it extinguished non-Indian access rights;
private ownership entailed the right to exclude Indians and non-Indians alike,
irrespective of the treaty.0 Under the reading suggested by the Winanses and
accepted by the circuit court, if the Yakama wanted to continue fishing they
would have to do so at public sites or with a property owner's permission;
whatever rights they might have secured through the treaty were trumped by the
"perfect, absolute title" that riverfront landowners acquired through federal
patents.4'
The Winanses also had an alternative theory. Even if the treaty reserved to
the Yakama certain rights of access and use that survived the transfer of
riverfront lands to private ownership, they argued these rights were
34. Id. at 380.
35. Id. at 377.
36. Id. at 379.
37. Id. at 380.
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"subordinate to the powers acquired by the state upon its admission to the
Union." '42 Since statehood was granted on an equal footing with the original
states, upon admission to the Union, Washington acquired authority over lands
within its boundaries equal to that held by other states over lands within their
boundaries, subject only to congressional power over interstate commerce.43
The Winanses argued that under the submerged lands doctrine, the state's
authority over lands below the high water mark of navigable waters within its
boundaries included the power to dispose of treaty access rights, and that the
state's grant of a license for the Winanses' fish wheels was a legitimate exercise
of this power.44
Writing for the Court, Justice McKenna rejected each of these arguments.45
He noted first that under the argument accepted by the lower court, the Yakama
acquired no more rights through their treaty than were already held by other
inhabitants of the region - "no rights but such as they would have had without
the treaty." To Justice McKenna this was a perverse reading of the treaty.
Such a bargain would have been "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a
convention which seemed to promise more, and give the word of the nation for
more." '47 It was absurd to think that the Yakama intended to reserve nothing
more than what they would have possessed as common inhabitants of the
region. Under Justice McKenna's analysis, the lower court had turned the
fishing clause on its head by reading it as a grant of rights, as though tribe
members had no rights at treaty time and the government had magnanimously
bestowed upon them whatever rights they now held.48 But the tribe did have
rights at treaty time, including rights to occupy and use the lands, game, and
fish within its traditional territories.49 Upon signing the treaty, the Yakama
relinquished most of these rights; however, they expressly reserved a right to
continue fishing at customary off-reservation sites. Because tribe members
could not exercise this right without entering onto and temporarily occupying
42. Id. at 382.
43. Id. at 382-83.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 383-84.
46. Id. at 380.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 380-81.
49. SeeJohnsonv. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,574(1823) ("[Indians] were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of
it, and to use it according to their own discretion...").
[Vol. 31
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these sites, the court concluded, rights to such entry and occupancy were
impliedly provided for in the treaty."0
Concessions made by the tribes, Justice McKenna reasoned, could only have
been understood as a relinquishment of certain rights to the United States -
rights of ownership and sovereignty over tribal territories - and a reservation
of rights not thus granted. 5' The right to continue fishing at customary sites was
among the rights reserved by the Yakama."2 As the parties recognized,
however, this right had to be accommodating to new conditions presented by
the arrival of hundreds (and eventually millions) of American settlers in the
tribe's ceded territories. As Justice McKenna explained, the fishing clause was
meant to accommodate the tribe's fishing-based economies and cultures to the
new circumstances unfolding around the Yakama people.53 The Court
concluded that the clause could only be understood as reserving to tribe
members a right to use customary off-reservation fishing sites in much the same
manner they had always enjoyed. 4
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a part
of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which
there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much
less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere
they breathed. New conditions came into existence, to which those
rights had to be accommodated .... And the form of the instrument
and its language was adapted to that purpose. Reservations [of
fishing rights] were not of particular parcels of land, and could not
be expressed in deeds... [but] were in large areas of territory and
the negotiations were with the tribe. They reserved rights, however,
to every individual Indian, as though named therein. They imposed
a servitude upon every piece of land as though described therein..
. The contingency of the future ownership of lands, therefore, was
foreseen and provided for; in other words, the Indians were given a
right in the land,--the right of crossing it to the river,--the right to
occupy it to the extent and for the purpose mentioned. No other
conclusion would give effect to the treaty.5"
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The Court spent little time on the claim that in the absence of congressional
action, only the state had authority to grant, dispose of, and regulate rights to
submerged lands within its boundaries. Citing its holding in Shively v. Bowlby,
which upheld the power of Congress to grant or reserve land rights for purposes
appropriate to the objects for which the United States held the territory,56 the
Court concluded that extinguishing Indian title, and making concessions to the
tribes, was clearly appropriate to achieve the objectives of the United States for
the territory in 1855. The government wanted to open Yakama lands to
American settlement. To do so it had to extinguish aboriginal title, and to
extinguish aboriginal title it had to make concessions to the Yakama.
Therefore, reserving to the tribe a right to fish at customary sites was a
legitimate and binding exercise of federal power, which the State of
Washington could not override through its licensing process. 7
In Seufert Brothers Co. v. UnitedStates,8 another case involving fish wheels,
the Court considered whether one tribe's access rights extended to places in the
ceded territory of a different tribe. Ten years after Winans, Yakama fishers
found their access to sites along the south bank of the Columbia River
obstructed by Seufert Brothers' fish wheels. 9 The tribe sought another
injunction and Seufert answered by asserting that Yakama fishing rights did not
extend to the south side of the river because the tribe's ceded territories were to
the north of the river.'
The lower court had found that sites on both sides of the river had long been
used in common by the Yakama and other Columbia River tribes. Relying on
these findings, the Supreme Court held that the Yakama were entitled to cross
over and temporarily use any sites which they were accustomed to using at
treaty time, including sites outside their ceded territories. "To restrain the
Yakima Indians to fishing on the north side and shore of the river would greatly
restrict the comprehensive language of the treaty... and would substitute for
the natural meaning of the expression.., the artificial meaning which might be
given to it by the law and by lawyers."'"
Thus, after Winans, the basic right of treaty tribe members to use and occupy
riverfront lands at traditional fishing sites was safe from challenge. Winans is
the Court's definitive statement of the right of access reserved to the tribes
56. Id. at 383-84 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1892)).
57. Id. at 384.
58. 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
59. See id. at 195-96.
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 199.
[Vol. 31
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through the Stevens Treaties. Under the rule established in Winans, treaty tribe
members may occupy lands abutting their accustomed fishing sites to the extent
necessary to exercise their rights of taking and curing fish: they may cross over
them, camp on them during fishing seasons, and build temporary smokehouses
on them.62 Seufert extended the geographic scope of these rights by
establishing that a tribe's "usual and accustomed" fishing sites are not confined
within the boundaries of its ceded territories, but include all places which its
members regularly used at treaty time.63 Pe;haps most importantly, Winans and
Seufert established that property owners may be enjoined from obstructing or
otherwise interfering with the tribes' rights to enter and use their traditional
fishing sites.
III. Harvest Allocation Rights: Sohappy v. Smith64 and United States v.
Washington
65
Legal questions about harvest allocation rights under the Stevens Treaties
were initially raised during litigation over state restrictions on Indian fishing.
Long after the Supreme Court resolved the access rights issue in Winans and
Seufert, treaty fishing rights were still being suppressed through state fishing
regulations in Oregon and Washington. The Supreme Court partially addressed
the question of state authority to regulate treaty fishing in Tulee v.
Washington.66 In Tulee, the Court held that fishing license fees could not be
applied to tribe members because they impaired the exercise of treaty-reserved
fishing rights, and because the purposes for which they were imposed could be
achieved through other means.67
Although claims of a treaty-reserved right to a guaranteed share of the
harvest were always implicit in the tribes' objections to state regulation of their
fisheries,68 the issue of harvest allocation did not begin to surface until Puyallup
169 The principal issue in the Puyallup cases was whether, and to what extent,
the state was empowered to restrict the exercise of treaty fishing rights.7" After
62. See generally Winans, 198 U.S. at 383-84.
63. Seufert, 249 U.S. at 199.
64. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
65. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
66. 315 U.S. 682 (1942).
67. Id. at 685.
68. See, e.g., id.; Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash. (Puyallup 1), 391 U.S. 392
(1968); Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup 11), 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
69. 391 U.S. 392.
70. Id. at 393; Puyallup II, 414 U.S. at 48.
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the Court held, in Puyallup I, that the states could restrict fishing by Puyallup
tribe members only if the restrictions were necessary to conserve the fishery and
did not discriminate against Indian fishers,7 the Washington Department of
Fisheries altered its regulations to allow Indian net fishing for non-steelhead
salmonids in the Puyallup River.72 However, the Washington Department of
Game, which had jurisdiction over the steelhead fishery, maintained a total
statewide ban on net fishing for steelhead.13 The Tribe then brought a new
challenge in state court, arguing that the restriction on steelhead net fishing was
discriminatory because treaty fishers used only nets and the ban, therefore, had
the effect of allocating the entire Puyallup River steelhead catch to non-treaty
fishers.74 The Tribe also argued that the regulation was not necessary to
conserve the steelhead fishery because conservation needs could be met by
placing appropriate restrictions on non-treaty fishing. The Tribe's challenge
was rejected in Washington's courts and ended up before the Supreme Court
again in Puyallup I.76
State regulations burdened treaty access rights through license fees77 and
restrictions on gear, season, and location;" they also burdened treaty allocation
rights by enabling non-treaty fishers to take the lion's share of available fish.
In Puyallup Ithe Court suggested that the tribes had a right to a portion of the
harvest as well as a right to freedom from discriminatory state regulation.79
From the Tribe's perspective it was obvious that the right to catch fish free of
state regulation was seamlessly linked with the right to a share of the harvest.
The ban on steelhead net fishing violated treaty rights directly, by eliminating
the treaty steelhead fishery, as well as indirectly, by allocating all harvestable
steelhead to non-treaty fishers.80
Writing for a unanimous Court in Puyallup II, Justice William 0. Douglas
recognized that the effects, and perhaps the motives, of Washington's
71. Puyallup1, 391 U.S. at 398.
72. Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. at 46.
73. Id. Non-steelhead salmonids were considered commercial fish and were thus under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Fisheries. Steelhead were considered game fish and were
therefore under the jurisdiction of the Department of Game.
74. See id. at 46-47.
75. See id. at 49.
76. See generally Puyallup H1, 414 U.S. 44.
77. See Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
78. See Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash. (Puyallup 1), 391 U.S. 392 (1968);
Puyallup 11, 414 U.S. 44.
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"conservation" measures were as much economic and allocative as they were
biological."' The Court suggested that some sort of fair apportionment of
harvestable fish between Indian and non-Indian fishers was necessary to fulfill
the government's treaty obligations.
There is discrimination here because all Indian net fishing is barred
and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-empted by non-Indians,
is allowed .... If hook-and-line fishermen now catch all the
steelhead which can be caught within the limits needed for
escapement, then that number must in some manner be fairly
apportioned between Indian net fishing and non-Indian sports
fishing so far as that particular species is concerned .... The aim
is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty and the
rights of other people.82
When Puyallup Ilwas decided, the District Court for the District of Oregon
had already issued a landmark ruling on the harvest allocation issue. In the
summer of 1968, Richard Sohappy and his uncle David Sohappy, Yakama tribe
members, staged a "fish-in" and were arrested for fishing with a gill net on the
Oregon side of the Columbia River in violation of Oregon fishing regulations. 3
Joined by twelve other Yakama fishers, the Sohappys brought suit against state
fish and game officials, seeking a declaratory judgment defining their treaty
right of taking fish and the scope of the state's power to regulate their
fisheries.' Shortly after the Sohappys filed suit, the United States, as trustee for
the Columbia Basin's four treaty tribes, also filed suit against the state, asking
the court to define the tribes' fishing rights and the extent to which Oregon
could restrict them.85 The two cases were consolidated and decided in July
1969.86 Sohappy v. Smith was the first case in which a court directly addressed
the implications of the Stevens Treaties for disputes over the apportionment of
treaty-area fisheries.
In Sohappy, the tribes and the United States argued that before the state
could lawfully regulate treaty fishing it was obligated by the treaties to
81. See generally id.
82. Id. at 48-49 (emphasis added).
83. FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER
NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 78 (1986). Fish-ins were used by treaty fishers throughout
the Northwest to initiate legal challenges to state restrictions on the exercise of treaty fishing
rights. Id.
84. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 903-04 (D. Or. 1969).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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regulate the taking of fish [so] that the treaty tribes and their
members will be accorded an opportunity to take, at their usual and
accustomed fishing places, by reasonable means feasible to them, a
fair and equitable share of alifish which it permits to be taken from
any given run.7
The tribes and the United States also contended that, to meet conservation
objectives, the state "may lawfully restrict or prohibit non-Indian fishing...
without imposing similar restrictions on treaty Indians," and that the state could
not regulate treaty fishing at customary tribal sites unless it first established that
its regulations were "the least restrictive which can be imposed consistent with
assuring the necessary escapement of fish for conservation purposes.""8 The
state argued that the fishing clauses gave treaty fishers only the same rights as
possessed by all other citizens, except for those established in Winans and
Tulee.8 9 The state argued further that it was entitled to impose any restrictions
it deemed necessary on treaty fishing, even to the point of banning fishing
completely along the entire reach of the tribes' customary fishing grounds, so
long as the restrictions were imposed for conservation purposes and the
restrictions were applied equally to non-treaty fishers fishing at the same sites.90
It is important to understand the scope of the tribes' principal claim in
Sohappy and the dramatic contrast between the tribes' position and that of the
state. All of the usual and accustomed fishing places used by Columbia Basin
treaty tribes are located along the middle reaches of the Columbia and its
tributaries, above Bonneville Dam and other mainstem dams.9' Prior to
implementation of the court's decision in Sohappy, harvest as well as hatchery
production of Columbia Basin salmonids were managed almost exclusively for
the benefit of lower river non-Indian commercial fishers, who operated
exclusively below Bonneville and the other dams.92 Some resources were
devoted to maintaining upriver steelhead runs for non-Indian sports fishers, but
the rights and interests of treaty Indian fishers were ignored. 93 By 1969, dams
and other forms of development on the mainstem Columbia and lower Snake
87. Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Id. ("rights of access over private lands and exemption from the payment of license
fees").
90. Id.
91. See COHEN, supra note 83, at 118. Bonneville Dam is the lowermost of the mainstem
Columbia's thirteen dams. Id. at 121, fig. 8.2.
92. See id. at 40-44. "Losers in the competition were the Indians .... Id. at 40.
93. See id. at 5, 45-46.
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Rivers decimated middle and upper river salmon runs.' Hatcheries had been
built in an effort to mitigate these losses, but these hatcheries had all been sited
in the lower river, below the dams and their lethal effects but also below the
usual and accustomed fishing sites of the Basin's treaty tribes.95 Throughout
the 1960s, nearly all the Basin's harvestable salmon were taken in the lower
river by non-treaty commercial fishers.96 As a consequence of the dams and of
other forms of development in mid- to upper-Basin, the practical effect of
statutes and regulations that failed to differentiate between treaty and non-treaty
fishing was to allocate almost the entire fishery to non-treaty fishers.
In Sohappy, the tribes and the United States asked the court to declare that
these statutes and regulations were in violation of the tribes' treaty-reserved
rights to take fish.97 The tribes asked the court to require Oregon to revise its
regulatory system to ensure that a "fair and equitable share" of the Basin's
harvestable fish would pass upriver and be available for tribal harvest.98 They
argued that the state, as successor to federal treaty obligations, had a
responsibility to prevent the tribes' rightful share of treaty-area fish from being
monopolized by lower-river non-treaty fishers, and to ensure that a fair share
of the Basin's fish would actually reach the places where the tribes could
harvest them.99
In an opinion written by Judge Robert Belloni, the court affirmed the tribes'
position on every major point in contention.'0° Judge Belloni began by noting
that, under the state's interpretation, the fishing clauses give treaty fishers "only
the same rights as given to all other citizens."' 0 ' He followed this with the
mordant observation that "[s]uch a reading would not seem unreasonable if all
history, anthropology, biology, prior case law and the intention of the parties
to the treaty were to be ignored."'0 2 After pointing out that the United States
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 70, 120-21.
97. Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 904 (1969).
98. Id. at 907.
99. Id. In addition to calling for a "fair and equitable share" of the Basin's harvestable fish,
the tribes insisted that they be permitted to capture these fish "by reasonable means feasible to
them." Id. The tribes wanted to be allowed to use gill nets, a much more efficient method of
capturing salmon. Before implementation of Judge Belloni's decision, gill nets were banned
throughout the river. See Dep't ofGame ofWash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup I), 414 U.S. 44,
46(1973).
100. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. 899.
101. Id.at9O4-05.
102. Id. at 905.
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and the tribes were in essential agreement as to the meaning of the fishing
clauses, and that, among the parties, only Oregon disagreed, Judge Belloni
looked briefly at the context in which the treaties were negotiated." 3 He
reiterated one of the basic canons of treaty construction: "It is our responsibility
to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as possible, in
accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal
representatives at the council... ."' Tribal leaders, he suggested, would not
have signed the treaties without a promise from the United States that their
people would be entitled to continue taking fish at traditional fishing sites."5
The court identified the key issue in Sohappy as a question of "the limitation
on the state's power to regulate the exercise of the Indians' federal treaty
right."' Drawing from Puyallup I, decided two years earlier, Judge Belloni
articulated a three-part test for determining when a state regulation of treaty
fishing is permissible under the Stevens Treaties: "the regulation must be
necessary for the conservation of the fish.., must not discriminate against the
Indians.. ." and "must meet 'appropriate standards.""0 7 The three parts of this
test are intrinsically interconnected and difficult to separate in practice.
First, a regulation is inconsistent with the rights of treaty fishers if it is not
necessary to conserve the fishery. The burden of proving necessity is on the
state.108 "[T]he state must show that there is a need to limit the taking of fish
and that the particular regulation sought to be imposed upon the exercise of the
treaty right is necessary to the accomplishment of the needed limitation.
'' 09
Second, however, not every regulation that might be "necessary" to conserve
the fishery will pass scrutiny with the court."0 A conservation measure
affecting treaty fishing at customary upriver sites may be necessary, for
instance, only because the state concentrated its hatchery facilities in the lower
river, did not take appropriate measures to restrict non-treaty fishing, or
promised a disproportionate share of upriver fish to sports fishers. Under the
court's interpretation of the Puyallup I test, the "necessity" of a particular
conservation measure has to be assessed jointly with whether the measure is
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942)).
105. Id. at 906.
106. Id. at 906-07.
107. Id. at 907 (quoting Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash. (Puyallup 1), 391 U.S.
392, 397-99 (1968)).
108. Id. at 907-08.
109. Id. at 908.
110. See generally id. at 910-11.
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discriminatory."' A measure that limits treaty fishing will not be found
"necessary" in the sense required tojustify restrictions on the exercise of treaty
rights unless the burdens it imposes on treaty fishers are shared equally by non-
treaty fishers and the benefits it bestows on non-treaty fishers are shared equally
by treaty fishers.
Judge Belloni noted that, as a practical matter, state regulations and policies
on harvest and hatchery production were driven not only by conservation
concerns but also by concerns over how the resource would be allocated among
various interest groups."' "The regulations of [Oregon's fish and game]
agencies, as well as their extensive propagation efforts, are designed not just to
preserve the fish but to perpetuate and enhance the supply for their respective
user interests."' 3 Finding that fisheries management throughout the Basin was
being driven by apportionment decisions that failed to consider the rights of
treaty fishers, the court held that Oregon's existing regulatory scheme was
inconsistent with the state's duties as successor to federal treaty obligations." 4
Oregon recognizes sports fishermen and commercial fishermen and
seems to make an equitable division between the two. But the state
seems to have ignored the rights of the Indians who acquired a
treaty right to fish at their historic off-reservation fishing stations.
If Oregon intends to maintain a separate status of commercial and
sports fisheries, it is obvious a third must be added, the Indian
fishery. The treaty Indians, having an absolute right to that fishery,
are entitled to a fair share of the fish produced by the Columbia
River system. 15
Thus, the court affirmed the argument, advanced by the plaintiffs, that to be
nondiscriminatory the state's regulations must accord treaty fishers an
opportunity to catch fish at their customary upriver sites equal to the
opportunity other fishers are given to catch fish." 6
The court declined to decide the issue of what constitutes an "appropriate
standard" for regulating treaty fishing, the third part of the Puyallup test.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 910.
113. Id. at 909.
114. Id. at 911.
115. Id. at 910-11 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at911.
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Resolution of this issue was left to state regulators."7 In determining what
constitutes an "appropriate" regulation, however, the court cautioned that
the state cannot so manage the fishery that little or no harvestable
portion of the run remains to reach the upper portion of the stream
where the historic Indian places are mostly located ....
[P]rotection of the treaty right to take fish at the Indians'usual and
accustomed places must be an objective of the state's regulatory
policy co-equal with the conservation offish runs for other users.,"
Three months after filing its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
court issued a final decree granting the tribes' petition in full. Judge Belloni
ordered the state to deal with treaty fishing as a separate and distinct fishery,
subject to regulation only if the state establishes through hearings that
regulation is "reasonable and necessary for the conservation of the fish
resource." "9 To be necessary, a regulation "must be the least restrictive which
can be imposed consistent with assuring the necessary escapement of fish.' 20
The court also ordered the state to
regulate [the fishery so] that, except for unforeseeable circumstances
beyond its control, the treaty tribes and their members will be
accorded an opportunity to attempt to take, at their usual and
accustomed fishing places, by reasonable means feasible to them, a
fair and equitable share ofallfish which it permits to be taken from
any given run.1
21
Anticipating further disputes between the tribes and the state, the court retained
continuing jurisdiction over the case. 2 2 Its ruling was not appealed.
The next stage of fishing clause jurisprudence was played out in the District
Court for the Western District of Washington. Eleven months after the final
decree in Sohappy, the United States filed suit on its own behalf and as trustee
for seven western Washington Indian tribes, seeking a declaratoryjudgment on
the tribes' fishing rights within the treaty case area, and an injunction to enforce
those rights.' 23 The seven plaintiff tribes were joined by seven intervenor
117. Id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Judgment at 2, Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (1969) (No. 68-409).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 4 (holding that the court still retains jurisdiction to oversee management of the
Columbia salmon fishery).
123. United States v. Washington (Phase 1), 384 F. Supp. 312,327-28 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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plaintiff tribes.2 4 The United States and the tribes asserted that the state lacked
authority to regulate treaty fishing, that the fishing clauses in their treaties 25
entitled the tribes to a specific allocation of harvestable salmon and steelhead
trout in the case area, that hatchery-origin fish must be included in the allocable
fish population, and that the tribes' right of taking fish incorporates an implied
right to have treaty fishery habitats protected from environmental
degradation.'26 By agreement of the parties, the latter two claims were
separated from the allocation claim and litigated in a subsequent trial.
127
Pretrial and trial proceedings in Phase I of United States v. Washington
lasted more than three years. Plaintiffs and defendants presented exhaustive
evidence on the history, culture, traditional territories and fishing practices of
the fourteen tribes, the history of the tribes' treaty negotiations with the United
States, the biological needs of salmon fisheries in the case area, the terms,
conditions, and policy objectives of post-treaty tribal and state fishing
regulations in the case area, the meaning and historical context of the key
phrases of the fishing clauses, and relevant case law. 28 Phase I was tried and
decided in a political climate of extreme antagonism directed at Indian fishers
by non-Indian fishers and state fish and game officers. 29
Named as plaintiffs in the original complaint were the Hoh Tribe, Makah Tribe, Muckleshoot
Tribe, Nisqually Tribe, Puyallup Tribe, Quileute Tribe, and the Skokomish Tribe. Id. at 423
n.1. The "case area" consists of all watersheds within or bordering either the tribes' ceded
territories and reservations lands. It includes the U.S. portion of the Puget Sound watershed,
the watersheds of the Olympic Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor watershed, and adjacent off-
shore waters. Id. at 327-28.
124. Id. at 423 n.2 (the Lummi Tribe, Quinault Tribe, Sauk-Suiattl Tribe, Squaxin Island
Tribe, Stillaguamish Tribe, Upper Skagit River Tribe, and the Yakama Nation).
125. Id. at 328. The fishing clauses in treaties between the United States and the tribes of
western Washington are substantially identical to the ones contained in treaties between the
United States and the tribes of the Columbia Basin. Some of the treaties with the tribes of
western Washington use the phrase "usual and accustomed grounds and stations" instead of
"usual and accustomed places" or "usual and accustomed stations;" and unlike the Columbia
Basin treaties, none of the treaties with the plaintiff tribes explicitly reserves to the tribes the
exclusive right of taking fish in streams running through or bordering their reservations
(excepting the treaty with the Yakama, whose traditional fishing stations included sites in both
the Phase I and the Sohappy v. Smith case areas). These phraseological differences were found
by the court to be insignificant. Id. at 423 n.12.
126. United States v. Washington (Phase 11), 506 F. Supp. 187, 190 (W. D. Wash. 1980).
127. Id. at 191. The hatchery fish issue and the fisheries habitat issue were litigated in Phase
II of the case, discussed infra Part V.
128. United States v. Washington (Phase 1), 384 F. Supp. 312, 334-39, 350-99, 406-08
(W.D. Wash. 1974).
129. COHEN, supra note 83, at 67-70. The conflict over Indian fishing rights in northwest
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
Judge George Boldt introduced his opinion by stating that the court's
ultimate objective was "to determine every issue of fact and law presented and,
at long last, thereby finally settle, either in this decision or on appeal thereof, as
many as possible of the divisive problems of treaty right fishing which for so
long have plagued all of the citizens of this area, and still do."'"3 His ninety-
three page ruling provides detailed demographic and historical information
about each of the plaintiff tribes, including a description of each tribe's
customary fishing grounds, an account of each tribe's treaty relationship with
the federal government, and a description of each tribe's political organization
and procedures for regulating treaty fishing. 3'
On the question of the state's authority to regulate treaty fisheries, the court
reluctantly followed the rule announced in Puyallup I and held that the state
could impose conservation-related restrictions on tribal fishing. 132 The court
Washington had been brewing since the early 1950s. Tribe members were constantly harassed,
threatened, and assaulted by non-Indian fishers. Indian fishers were repeatedly arrested for
violating state fishing regulations. State officers routinely confiscated their gear as evidence.
Their nets were cut, their boats were sunk, and they were shot at by vigilantes. Id.
130. Phase I, 384 F. Supp. at 330.
131. Id. at359-82.
132. Id. at 338-39. Judge Boldt expressed deep misgivings about this holding and pointed
out:
there has never been either legal analysis or citation of a non-dictum authority in
any decision of the Supreme Court of the Land in support of its decisions [in
Puyallup I and Puyallup 11] holding that state police power may be employed to
limit or modify the exercise of rights guaranteed by national treaties .... It also
appears that the United States Supreme Court has exercised a prerogative
specifically reserved by and to Congress in the treaties. Congress has never
exercised its prerogative to either limit or abolish Indian treaty right fishing ...
. Since Congress has the power to qualify or revoke any treaty or any provision
thereof, unquestionable federal authority is available to provide federal regulation,
or to authorize state regulation, for the protection of fishery resources against any
threatened or actual harm that might arise from off reservation treaty right fishing
by tribal members limited only by tribal regulation. In these circumstances it is
unfortunate, to say the least, that state police power regulation of off reservation
fishing should be authorized or invoked on a legal basis never specifically stated
or explained.
Id. at 338-39 (emphasis added) (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), for the
rule that Congress may unilaterally qualify or revoke treaties or treaty provisions); see also
Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United States Supreme
Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1972). After expressing his doubts, Judge Boldt conceded
that "judicial integrity" and the Supreme Court's rulings in Puyallup I and Puyallup H required
him to reject the tribes' contention that the state did not have authority to regulate treaty fishing.
Phase I, 384 F. Supp. at 339.
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insisted, however, that the state would not be allowed to use conservation
necessity to rationalize inequitable restrictions. 33 To explain this point, Judge
Boldt inserted lengthy quotations from Sohappy, including Judge Belloni's
summation of the state's obligation to balance the needs of conservation with
the need to protect the treaty fishery.134 "In the case of regulations affecting
Indian treaty fishing rights the protection of the treaty right to take fish at the
Indians' usual and accustomed places must be an objective of the state's
regulatory policy (at least) coequal with the conservation of fish runs for other
users."'
135
The Oregon court had held that Columbia Basin tribes are entitled to a "fair
share" of harvestable fish destined to pass their customary fishing sites.'36
Relying on Arizona v. California and a dictionary definition of the phrase "in
common with," Judge Boldt decided that a "fair share" meant that treaty fishers
had a right to take up to fifty percent of harvestable fish in treaty-area rivers,
streams, and coastal waters.'37 The question was whether the tribes' express
reservation of "the right to take fish . . . in common with citizens of the
Territory" contained an implied reservation of the right to a specific share of
harvestable fish.' 38 In Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that certain Indian
treaties which expressly reserved lands for occupancy of the treaty tribes had
impliedly reserved enough water to fulfill the tribes' irrigation needs, even
though no provision for water rights was included in the treaty. 39 Impliedly
reserved irrigation water rights "could only be limited in amount to the total
reasonably required by the needs of the treaty tribe as determined from time to
time indefinitely in the future."'4 ° Drawing by analogy from the Arizona
holding, Judge Boldt reasoned that by expressly reserving the right of taking
fish at their usual and accustomed places, the tribes impliedly reserved the right
to an allocation of fish reasonably sufficient to meet their needs, limited by the
further requirement that this right be exercised "in common with" non-treaty
fishers.41
133. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 346.
134. Id. at 345.
135. Id. at 346 (quoting Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (1969)).
136. Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 911.
137. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 343.
138. Id. at343-44.
139. Arizonav. California, 373 U.S. 546,600 (1963) (applying Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908)).
140. Phase L 384 F. Supp. at 342-43 (citing Arizona, 373 U.S. 546).
141. Id. at 343.
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Though the ruling in Phase I is complex and extremely detailed, Judge
Boldt's reasoning is fairly straightforward. Using standard canons of treaty
construction, he begins by trying to construe the fishing clauses as the tribes
themselves probably construed them at treaty time.'42 Following Justice
McKenna's artful formulation in Winans, he recognizes at the outset that treaty
rights were reserved by the tribes, not granted by the United States; they were
"part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which there
was not a shadow of impediment."'43 To grasp the meaning of the fishing
clauses as understood by tribal negotiators in 1855, the court had to determine
which rights the tribes meant to retain from the plenum they possessed prior to
execution of the treaties, and which rights they agreed to reduce or give up."
Under Judge Boldt's reconstruction of the treaty negotiations, the tribes
clearly meant to reserve exclusive rights to take fish from rivers and streams
within the small homelands they retained for their exclusive use and
occupation.'45 Because the tribes reserved exclusive on-reservation fishing
rights, the court decided that fish caught on reservations should not be included
in the sum of harvestable fish to be divided between treaty and non-treaty
fishers." The court further distinguished between tribal ceremonial and
subsistence fishing, on one hand, and tribal commercial fishing, on the other. '47
Because evidence at trial showed that at treaty time "the opportunity to take fish
for personal subsistence and religious ceremonies was the single matter of
utmost concern to all treaty tribes," Judge Boldt reasoned that fish taken to
fulfill ceremonial and subsistence needs should not be included in the sum of
harvestable fish to be divided between treaty and non-treaty fishers."'
The court thus began by reducing the non-treaty allocation of fish within the
treaty area to a share of all harvestable fish not destined for on-reservation
harvest, tribal subsistence harvest, or tribal ceremonial harvest.'49 The treaty
allocation, in turn, would be determined by adding 1) the number of fish taken
on reservations; 2) the number of fish expected to be taken by tribe members
for subsistence and ceremonial purposes; and 3) the number of remaining
142. Id. at 330-31 (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899)).
143. Id. at 331 (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 332, 423 n.12.
146. Id. at 343. Although exclusive on-reservation fishing rights were expressly reserved
in only one plaintiff tribe's treaty, the court held that each of the other tribes also reserved,
through implication, an exclusive right of taking fish on their reservations. Id. at 332 n. 12.





No. 1] FISHING RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 63
harvestable fish, reduced by the number allocated to non-treaty fishers in
accordance with the "in common with" language of the treaties."0
Through the fishing clauses, the tribes reserved rights to take fish at usual
and accustomed off-reservation grounds and stations."'5 Unlike their on-
reservation rights, however, the tribes' off-reservation rights were reserved
expressly on condition that off-reservation fishing would be done "in common
with" non-treaty fishers. 52 In Judge Boldt's analysis, this limitation carried two
crucial implications for the tribes' post-treaty allocation of harvestable fish. In
pre-treaty times, the tribes were entitled to take as many fish as needed or
wanted, limited only by intra-tribal and inter-tribal regulations.' 3 Upon
execution of the treaties, however, and upon the courts' cumulative
interpretation of the treaties, tribal harvests became subject to two additional
extra-tribal limitations. The number of any species of fish that could be taken
by treaty tribes was now reduced by 1) "[t]he number of fish required for
spawning escapement and any other requirements established to be reasonable
and necessary for conservation," and 2) "[tjhe number of harvestable fish non-
treaty fishermen may take at the tribes' 'usual and accustomed [off-reservation]
grounds and stations' while fishing 'in common with' treaty right fishermen.""s4
Although the conservation necessity doctrine was announced in Puyallup I
and has tenuous roots in dicta found in Winans and Tulee,"' by the time Phase
I was decided it was settled that states were empowered to restrict treaty
harvests to ensure perpetuation of each run. In interpreting the fishing clauses,
however, Judge Boldt was concerned less with the question of whether
Washington was empowered to regulate the fishery than with the question of




153. Traditional intra-tribal and inter-tribal fishing regulations clearly placed utmost
importance on conservation of the resource. Modem tribal regulations also include very strong
conservation measures. I stress this point to emphasize the absurdity of the state's contention,
at trial, that without state regulation of treaty fishing the resource would become endangered.
The court noted that "neither Game nor Fisheries has discovered and produced any credible
evidence showing any instance, remote or recent, when a definitely identified member of any
plaintiff tribe exercised his off reservation treaty rights by any conduct or means detrimental
to the perpetuation of any species of anadromous fish." Id. at 338 n.26.
154. Id. at 343.
155. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash. (Puyallup]), 391 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1968).
For the classic exposition of how the conservation necessity doctrine came to be created by
accident, out of nothing, see Johnson, supra note 132.
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of the treaties themselves. 156 Judge Boldt clearly believed that the tribes were
entitled to regulate their own fisheries, free of state interference, and should
eventually be fully and exclusively responsible for doing so.'5 Under his
reading of the fishing clauses, moreover, each party to the treaties, the United
States and the tribes alike, has a duty to conserve the fishery for the sake of the
other. "'58 By reserving no more than the right to fish "in common with" non-
Indians at off-reservation sites, the tribes assumed a treaty responsibility to
refrain from preventing non-Indian users from taking their rightful present or
future shares of the resource.
The fishing clauses themselves, in other words, affirmed a tribal duty to
refrain from overfishing or otherwise monopolizing the resource.'59 In Judge
Boldt's analysis, if the tribes had reserved an exclusive right to fish at off-
reservation sites, as they did at on-reservation sites, treaty fishers would have
no treaty-based obligation to conserve the fishery (though of course they would
still have obligations based on tribal law)."6 They did not do this, however, and
under the court's interpretation the treaty requirement of sharing off-reservation
fisheries in common with non-Indians bars the tribes from fishing off-
reservation in such a way as to threaten a fish run with extinction.' The
implied terms of the treaties themselves, with no added state or federal
regulation, prohibit the tribes from "pursu[ing] the last living steelhead until it
enters their nets.' 62
The phrase "in common with" also guided the court's determination of the
number of harvestable fish that non-treaty fishers are entitled to take from
treaty-area fisheries. The treaties, of course, did not specify how the resource
should be divided in the event of scarcity. All the parties seem to have assumed
that there would always be more than enough salmon to provide for the needs
156. See generally Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 346.
157. Id. at 340-41.




162. Id. at 338.. As Justice Douglas memorably stated in Puyallup II, "The police power of
the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the passenger pigeon;
and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until
it enters their nets." Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup 11) 414 U.S. 44, 49
(1973). He was correct about the Indians rights under the treaties, but not for the reasons he
cited. Treaty fishers are prohibited from exhausting a fish run not in virtue of Douglas's legal
fiction that a state government may regulate fishing rights without congressional authorization,
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of treaty fishers and non-treaty fishers alike.163 Since the treaties used the
phrase "in common with" but did not specify in percentages or numbers of fish
how the harvest was to be divided, the court relied on a dictionary to answer the
question:
By dictionary definition and as intended and used in the Indian
treaties and in this decision 'in common with' means sharing
equally the opportunity to take fish at 'usual and accustomed
grounds and stations'; therefore, non-treaty fishermen shall have the
opportunity to take up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish that
may be taken by all fishermen at usual and accustomed grounds and
stations and treaty right fishermen shall have the opportunity to take
up to the same percentage of harvestable fish ..... 6
By interpreting "in common with" to mean "sharing equally," and "sharing
equally" to mean a fifty-fifty division of the resource, Judge Boldt significantly
sharpened the "fair share" principle that Judge Belloni had employed five years
earlier to define the tribes' allocation rights. At the same time, Judge Boldt
realized that "precise mathematical equality" would be impossible to achieve
due to the far-flung nature of the fishery and the impracticability of determining
with any precision how many fish are destined to pass tribal fishing sites in any
given year. 
165
The court ordered the state to "take all appropriate steps within [its] actual
abilities to assure as nearly as possible an equal sharing" of fish destined to pass
the tribes' usual and accustomed fishing grounds."6 The court also recognized
that equal sharing of the resource would require an equitable division of
harvestable fish intercepted outside the state's jurisdiction but destined for
treaty-area waters. 167 A substantial but indeterminate portion of each run
originating in and returning to treaty-area waters is harvested by non-treaty
fishers in marine areas off the coasts of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington
163. The prospect of a collapse of Northwest fisheries did not become foreseeable until
industrial exploitation of the resource became feasible. Industrial exploitation of the resource
did not become feasible until the invention of canning technology and the rise of large-scale
commercial fish canneries. The first salmon cannery on the Columbia was built in 1866. The
first cannery on Puget Sound was built in 1877. JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS
84-90 (1999).
164. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 343 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 344.
167. Id.
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and Oregon. 6 Judge Boldt decided that because these fish were being
intercepted before they could be counted, the treaty allocation could not be
based solely on the number of harvestable fish that actually reached tribal
fishing grounds. 69 To compensate the tribes for fish caught by non-treaty
fishers beyond the state's jurisdiction, the court ordered the state to periodically
make equitable upward adjustments in the tribes' allocation.
1 70
The court also clarified that the state's obligation to assure equal sharing of
subject fisheries extended to its role in advising the Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission.' 7' The Commission is responsible for setting fishing restrictions
under the Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada by
controlling the "time, places and manner of harvest."' 72 Under the terms of that
treaty, Washington may provide input into the development of offshore salmon
harvest programs. 7 a The court's order required Washington to consider its
tribal treaty obligations in providing that input.
74
The political upshot of Judge Boldt's ruling in Phase I of United States v.
Washington was a forced shift in the basic objectives of fisheries management
in western Washington. Reinforcing and clarifying Judge Belloni's ruling in
Sohappy, the court held that the state could regulate treaty fishing only to the
extent necessary to conserve particular stocks of fish 175 and that the tribes were
entitled to up to fifty percent of harvestable fish destined to pass their fishing
grounds 7 1 (excluding fish caught on reservations 77 or for ceremonial or
subsistence purposes 17 ) and periodic equitable adjustments to compensate for
heavy off-shore fishing by foreign and domestic ships.
79
Judge Boldt defined conservation necessity as narrowly as possible: a state
regulation affecting treaty fishing would be unlawful unless it was both
"reasonable and necessary to prevent demonstrable harm to the actual








175. Id. at 342.
176. Id. at 343.
177. Id. at 332.
178. Id. at 343.
179. Id. at 344.
180. Id. at 342.
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conservation;" if alternative means are available, "the state cannot lawfully
restrict the exercise of off reservation treaty right fishing, even if the only
alternatives are restriction offishing by non-treaty fishermen."''
The court retained continuing jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter
of the case to ensure compliance with its orders.'82
IV. Federal Court Authority Over Treaty-Area Fisheries Management:
Gillnetters'83 and FLhing Vessel
8"
In May 1974, Judge Belloni, using the court's continuing jurisdiction in
Sohappy, applied Judge Boldt's formula to fish runs in the Columbia Basin.'85
Because neither Washington nor Oregon chose to appeal Sohappy, the formula
became binding law for Columbia Basin fisheries management. While Judge
Boldt was being forced to assume direct control of fisheries regulation in the
Washington area, Judge Belloni succeeded in convincing the tribes and the
states to settle their differences through negotiation.186 In early 1977, Oregon,
Washington, and the four Columbia Basin tribes reached agreement on a
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 405,419.
183. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151 (Wash. 1977); Puget Sound
Gillnetters Ass'n v. U.S. Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978).
184. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373
(Wash. 1977); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979).
185. COHEN, supra note 83, at 121.
186. Id. at 118. Various factors contributed to the states' willingness to negotiate in Oregon
instead of litigating like Washington did. The Columbia Basin fishery was geographically
simpler and had only one river system to manage instead of the numerous ones in northwestern
Washington. Id. at 119. There were also fewer tribes participating in Sohappy. Id. at 119-20.
More importantly, few salmon were still returning to the tribes' customary fishing sites on the
middle and upper Columbia after four decades of dam building. By the time Sohappy was
decided, nearly all remaining valuable fish runs in the Basin originated below Bonneville Darn.
Most originated from hatcheries and were taken by non-Indians in the lower river. Because the
customary sites at issue in Sohappy are above Bonneville Dam, while most of the Basin's
valuable fish runs are below it, the court's reaffirmation of treaty rights on the Columbia had
less immediate effect on the commercial value of the Basin's non-treaty fishery. The tribes in
northwestern Washington, by contrast, had customary fishing sites along the lower portions of
all the region's river systems and the valuable marine areas in Puget Sound, Grays Harbor, and
the Pacific Coast along the Olympic Peninsula. The greater commercial value of the
Washington tribes' fishing sites made the allocation rights at issue in Washington more
contentious than the ones at issue in Sohappy.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
comprehensive five-year plan for managing the Basin's fisheries and
apportioning its fish on an equal-sharing basis. 87
*The situation in northwestern Washington was more bleak. Conflicts there
between treaty and non-treaty fishers did not lend themselves to negotiated
settlements. Trying halfheartedly to bring the state into compliance with Judge
Boldt's ruling and the court's interim plan, the Washington Game Commission
and Department of Fisheries began overhauling the state's salmon and steelhead
fishing regulations. The goal, ostensibly, was to reduce non-treaty fishing and
permit half the region's harvestable fish in any given season to be taken by the
tribes. A few weeks after the court's decision was released, Judge Boldt
ordered the parties to adopt an interim plan for regulating fishing in the treaty
area, calling on the agencies and the Washington Reef Net Owners Association
to make significant reductions in the non-Indian fishery. 8'
State officials and non-treaty commercial and sport fishers resisted the
court's decision and the new regulations on multiple fronts. The state
immediately appealed. While the appeal was pending, non-treaty commercial
and sport fishers began systematically disobeying the new regulations.8 9
Officers from the Game Commission and Fisheries Department made a weak
attempt to enforce the new rules by issuing hundreds of citations for illegal non-
treaty fishing.' 90 At the local level, county prosecutors and judges responded
to this affront by dismissing nearly all the citations.' 9'
In June 1975, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Boldt's
decision in every major respect, with only a slight modification to the equitable
adjustments he had ordered for the tribes. 92 Six months later, the United States
187. Id. at 122.
188. Id. at 87, 92.
189. Id. at 92-93.
190. Id. at93.
191. Id.
192. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals
agreed that there should be periodic equitable adjustments in favor of the tribes to compensate
them for offshore fishing by U.S. non-treaty fishers. Id. Where offshore fishing benefits
Washington citizens, the court agreed that treaty fishers should be compensated with a greater-
than-fifty percent share of the fish that make it back to Washington waters. Id. It held,
however, that "the [district] court's equitable discretion does not extend so far as to permit it
to compensate the tribes for the unanticipated heavy fishing by foreign ships off the coast." Id.
Because treaty tribes and non-Indian Washington citizens are affected equally, the court of
appeals found no need to compensate the tribes for offshore fishing by foreign vessels. Id.
"The treaty granted equal rights at the traditional areas to Washington citizens, and their ability
to fish is equally impaired by foreign fishing." Id. This minor modification in Judge Boldt's
allocation formula had the effect of slightly reducing the number of fish allocated to the tribes.
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Supreme Court denied certiorari and the decision became binding.93 State
officials and non-treaty commercial and sport fishing groups unrelentingly
resisted. Even before the Ninth Circuit decision, the Puget Sound Gillnetters
Association, Washington State Kelpers Association, and Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association filed separate suits in
Thurston County Superior Court against the Fisheries Department, seeking to
enjoin the new regulations."9 Against Judge Boldt's express order 95 and
despite the fact that the suits involved collusive litigation,'96 the plaintiffs won
favorable rulings in the county court.97
In June 1977, in Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Washington, the
Washington Supreme Court upheld a Thurston County Superior Court decision
invalidating the new regulations. 98 Ignoring that the Boldt decision had been
upheld by the Ninth Circuit, and that the U.S. Supreme Court had declined to
review it, a five-member majority of the Washington Supreme Court declared
that "[b]eing cited no authority for the proposition that federal district courts
have exclusive jurisdiction[] to construe Indian treaties[,] treaties which affect
important interests of the state[,] we adhere to our own interpretation of the
treaty."'" The court interpreted the treaties as reserving to the tribes only an
equal opportunity to go fishing, not a percentage of the fishery.00 The Fisheries
Department, the court concluded, had authority to regulate fishing for purposes
of conservation but not for purposes of allocating the resource; it was barred
from apportioning fish specially to a particular class of fishers.20'
Six weeks later, the state supreme court reinforced Gillnetters by upholding
another decision from the same county court. In Washington Commercial
PassengerFishing VesselAss 'n v. Washington, a seven-member majority again
The formula's basic fifty-fifty division of harvestable fish was unaffected.
193. United States v. Washington, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
194. COHEN, supra note 83, at 92. The Puget Sound Gillnetters Association and the
Washington Kelpers Association represented non-treaty commercial fishers. Id. The
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association represented charter sport
salmon fishing companies. Id.
195. United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1034 (W.D. Wash. 1978). Exercising
his continuing jurisdiction, Judge Boldt ordered the Thurston County Court to refrain from
carrying out rulings which deprived the tribes of their share of the fishery and noted that the
Thurston County suits "hardly resembl[ed] contested cases." Id. at 1031 n.3.
196. Id. The plaintiffs and defendant had the same ultimate objective. Id.
197. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 565 P.2d 1151, 1152 (Wash. 1977).
198. Id. at 1159.
199. Id. at 1158.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1159.
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affirmed that the Department of Fisheries had no authority to allocate a specific
share of fish to treaty fishers. 2 The court held that the allocative regulations
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
more than half of the area's harvestable fish were being allocated to a class of
fishers who constituted a mere .028 percent of the state's overall population.0 3
In the wake of the state supreme court's rulings in Gillnetters and Fishing
Vessel, the Fisheries Department found itself in the crossfire of conflicting state
and federal rulings.2 ' Thor Tollefson, Director of Fisheries, was caught
between Scylla and Charybdis: he would be in contempt of the state supreme
court if he maintained the restrictions and in contempt of the federal court if he
did not. 05 The federal court soon freed him from his dilemma by assuming
control of treaty-area fishing regulations under the court's continuing
jurisdiction in Washington (Phase I).2'1 The Fisheries Advisory Board - a
creature of the court consisting of one tribal representative, one state
representative, and one court appointed chairman/technical advisor2 7 -
developed a management plan for the 1977 and 1978 fishing seasons, which
Judge Boldt adopted as a court order.20" The plan was enforced by a special
team of federal officers from the Departments of Interior, Justice, Commerce,
and Transportation.2 9 Persons caught fishing in violation of the plan were
charged with contempt of court.2 10
Shortly after adoption of the plan, the court's authority to manage treaty-area
fisheries was challenged by the Puget Sound Gillnetters Association.2 1' The
Gillnetters' action was consolidated with another action brought by other non-
treaty fishing groups against the court-ordered plan in Sohappy12 and was heard
by a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Reprising
arguments they had used successfully at the state court level, the fishing groups
contended that the court-imposed plans denied equal protection to non-Indians
202. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 571 P.2d 1373,
1374 (Wash. 1977).
203. Id. at 1378.
204. COHEN, supra note 83, at 99.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 99-100.
207. Id. at 94.
208. Id. at 100.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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by allocating a disproportionate share of treaty-area fish to Indians,213 that the
courts abused their discretion by seizing control of treaty-area fisheries, 214 and
that even if the courts had acted within their authority, their orders were
unenforceable against fishers and fishing groups who were not parties to the
cases.
2 15
The court of appeals firmly rejected each ofthese arguments. Before turning
to the merits of the parties' claims, Judge Goodwin noted the unusually
discordant campaign that had been carried out by Washington state officials and
non-treaty fishing groups to resist Judge Boldt's apportionment order.
The state's extraordinary machinations in resisting the decree have
forced the district court to take over a large share of the
management of the state's fishery in order to enforce its decrees.
Except for some desegregation cases, the district court has faced the
most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a
federal court witnessed in this century. The challenged orders in
this appeal must be viewed by this court in the context of events
forced by litigants who offered the court no reasonable choice.216
Addressing the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, Judge Goodwin began his
opinion by noting the principle, established in Morton v. Mancari, 7 that
preferential treatment by the federal government of members of Indian tribes
is based on political distinctions, not racial distinctions, and is constitutional so
long as it is given on the basis of membership in a "quasi-sovereign tribal
entit[y]" and not on the basis of membership in a certain ethnic group.218 As the
Mancari Court reasoned, preferential treatment of Indian tribe members does
not constitute invidious racial discrimination when the government's actions are
rationally related to the United States' unique obligations toward the tribes.219
213. Id. at 1127.
214. Id. at 1129.
215. Id. at 1132.
216. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted).
217. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
218. Gillnetters, 573 F.2d at 1127 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 n.24).
219. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. In Mancari, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that
preferences given to tribe members are "not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of
'Indians'; instead, [such preferences] appl[y] only to members of'federally recognized' tribes.
This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified as 'Indians.' In this
sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature." Id. at 554 n.24. The Gillnetters
court cited Mancari in its discussion of the special fishery rights held by treaty tribe members
to emphasize that these rights are based on the tribal members' status, not as "Indians," but as
enrolled members of sovereign tribal nations that have historically and politically unique
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Under the Mancari principle, fish allocations favoring tribe members do not
constitute invidious racial discrimination if the allocations are based on unique
political relationships between the tribes and the federal government. Where
these unique political relationships are concerned, "[c]omparisons between the
numbers of treaty and nontreaty fishers, or the quantity of fish each category
has an opportunity to take, are simply irrelevant under the law. The treaty tribes
reserved their preexisting rights to fish, and they continue, as quasi-sovereign
entities, to hold those reserved rights."2 '
According to the court, an equal protection issue would arise in the context
of fish apportionment orders only if the district courts had attempted to apply
those orders beyond the geographic scope of the treaties, which they did not do.
Drawing an analogy from the rights of cotenants under a common law
cotenancy, Judge Goodwin concluded that the present-day disparity arising
under the equal sharing formula between the ratio of treaty-allocated fish to
treaty fishers and the ratio of treaty-allocated fish to non-treaty fishers should
be viewed simply as "the unremarkable result of normal principles of property
law applied to changing numbers within cotenant classes." '' 2
The court next addressed the fishing groups' assertion that the district courts
had abused their discretion by taking control of state fisheries to enforce the
apportionment orders. The issue here, as Judge Goodwin framed it, was not
whether the orders themselves were proper, but whether some of the actions
taken to enforce the orders were legitimately within the district courts'
authority.2 Reasoning that the district courts could not have protected the
tribes' rights without imposing restrictions on non-treaty fishing, the appellate
court concluded that these courts had broad discretion and had not abused it.223
"If the nontribal fishery were not limited, the tribal fishery would never have
the opportunity to take its full share .... Preserving the tribal opportunity
requires limiting the nontribal opportunity."'224
Lastly, the court held that in-state non-treaty fishers and fishing
organizations who were never parties to either of the cases were bound by the
courts' enforcement orders.225 The issue here was whether treaty rights were
enforceable against private citizens and companies as well as against state
relationships with the United States.





225. Id. at 1132-33.
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officials.226 Judge Goodwin reasoned that treaty rights are enforceable against
citizens and companies because citizens and companies are automatically in
privity with one of the defendant states whenever they engage in fishing in
treaty-area waters.227 The court noted that under the laws of both Oregon and
Washington, title to non-domestic fish within state boundaries belongs to the
state, and a non-treaty fisher's right to take those fish is entirely derivative of
the state's power to protect its possessory interest by regulating the fishery.228
Reasoning that the interests of non-treaty fishers in Washington are derivative
of the interests of the defendant state, the court concluded that they "are in
privity with the state and are bound by actions affecting its sovereign interests
to which it is a party. This being the case, the district court had authority to act
against the fishers directly when it appeared that the state was unable to do
SO." 
22 9
The court's decision left state officials and non-treaty fishers in Washington
with one remaining tool in their campaign against the federal courts'
interpretation of the fishing clauses. Although the United States Supreme Court
had already denied certiorari in Washington, it could still elect to review the
case. Because the district court retained continuing jurisdiction, the case had
not been finally adjudicated.230 After the state supreme court's decisions in
Gillnetters and Fishing Vessel and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gillnetters,
moreover, the federal Supreme Court could opt to review the equal-sharing rule
in the context of two other cases now standing before it. Gillnetters and
Fishing Vessel gave the Court a strong new incentive to revisit the Boldt
decision, because now a state supreme court's interpretation of a federal treaty
was in direct conflict with the interpretation supplied by federal courts. 23' In
October 1978, the Court finally accepted the state's appeal in Washington,
consolidating it for review with the state's appeal in Fishing Vessel and the
fishing groups' appeal in Gillnetters.232
226. Id. at 1132.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1132-33 (citations omitted).
230. The Supreme Court explained its reasoning on this point by noting, "Our earlier denial
[of certiorari] came at an interlocutory stage in the proceedings - the District Court has
retained continuing enforcement jurisdiction over the case - so that we certainly are not
required to treat the earlier disposition as final for our purposes." Washington v. Wash. State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 672 n. 19 (1979).
231. Id.
232. Id. Despite the fact that the state's appeal of United States v. Washington was the
principal case on review and was by far the most important of the three consolidated cases,
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Washington, represented by its attorney general (and soon-to-be U.S.
Senator), Slade Gorton, reasserted the main argument it had made before the
district court, that treaty fishers reserved no rights beyond those enjoyed by
non-treaty fishers, except: 1) a right to cross over private lands to gain access
to customary fishing sites and 2) an exemption from the payment of license
fees.233 Joined by the commercial fishing groups, the state also reasserted its
objections to the district courts' remedial orders. The state and the fishing
groups argued, first, that state Game and Fisheries Departments were prohibited
from following the orders because doing so required them to take actions they
were not authorized to take under state law, and second, that the courts
exceeded their authority when they took control of treaty-area fisheries
management.234
Writing for a six-member majority, Justice Stevens rejected each of these
arguments. With two minor exceptions, the Court upheld every aspect of Judge
Boldt's apportionment order, as well as the actions the district courts
subsequently took to enforce his equal-sharing formula. The Court held that the
fishing clauses reserve to treaty fishers the right to harvest a fair share of each
run of fish passing through the tribes' customary fishing grounds.235 Justice
Stevens acknowledged that the key phrase, "in common with," could plausibly
be interpreted both in the manner suggested by the United States and the tribes
and in the manner suggested by Washington. 236 He concluded, however, that
the interpretation suggested by the United States and the tribes was more
consistent with the way the phrase was probably understood by tribal
representatives at treaty time.237
That each individual Indian would share an "equal opportunity"
with thousands of newly arrived individual settlers is totally foreign
to the spirit of the negotiations .... Because the Indians had always
exercised the right to meet their subsistence and commercial needs
by taking fish from treaty area waters, they would be unlikely to
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass 'n was listed first
in the case heading. As a result, the Supreme Court's review of United States v. Washington
is often referred to as Fishing Vessel and will be referred to as such in the remainder of this
article. The reader should be careful not to confuse Fishing Vessel, the United States Supreme
Court case, with Fishing Vessel, the Washington Supreme Court case.
233. Id. at 670-71, 675.
234. Id. at 692-93.
235. Id. at 679, 684-85.
236. Id. at 677.
237. Id. at 677-78.
[Vol. 31
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/2
No. 1] FISHING RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 75
perceive a "reservation" of that right as merely the chance, shared
with millions of other citizens, occasionally to dip their nets into the
territorial waters.238
Justice Stevens found convincing support for this interpretation in all six
previous cases in which the Court had ruled on the meaning of the fishing
clauses.239 "[T]he principal issue involved," he stated, "is virtually a 'matter
decided' by our previous holdings." 2" In Winans and the Puyallup trilogy in
particular, he reasoned, the Court had "adopted essentially the interpretation
that the United States is reiterating here."24' In the first place, Justice Stevens
pointed out, the Winans court had explicitly rejected an earlier incarnation of
the state's "equal opportunity" theory when it held that the fishing clauses
promised more to tribe members than just the right to go fishing alongside and
under the same terms as non-tribe members.242 In the second place, the
Puyallup trilogy "clearly establish[ed] the principle that neither party to the
treaties may rely on the State's regulatory powers or on property law concepts
to defeat the other's right to a 'fairly apportioned' share of each covered run of
harvestable anadromous fish. 243
The Court concluded that the district courts had calculated the treaty and
non-treaty allocations of fish in the treaty area correctly.2" Justice Stevens
reasoned that a fair apportionment consistent with the wording of the fishing
clauses should begin by dividing the harvestable portion of each run that passes
the tribes' customary fishing sites into roughly equal treaty and non-treaty
shares;2 45 if tribal fishery-related needs have diminished and the tribes are able
to earn a moderate living from a smaller percentage of harvestable fish, the
treaty share should then be reduced accordingly. 21 Justice Stevens also agreed
that the treaty share should be equitably adjusted to compensate treaty fishers
238. Id. at 676, 678-79.
239. Id. at 679.
240. Id.; see Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, (Puyallup Tribe II1), 433 U.S. 165
(1977); Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup Tribe I1), 414 U.S. 44 (1973);
Dep't of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup Tribe 1), 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 682 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1918);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
241. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
242. Id. at 680-81.
243. Id. at 682-83.
244. Id. at 685.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 685-86 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)).
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for fish taken by domestic non-treaty fishers beyond the jurisdiction of the
state.247
While agreeing with the district courts' basic harvest allocation formula, the
Court simplified the apportionment rules by holding that fish caught on
reservations and fish caught by treaty fishers for subsistence or ceremonial
purposes should be included in the treaty allocation so that the total catch,
rather than just the commercial catch, would count toward the tribes' share.248
This had the effect of reducing the tribal share by a small percentage.249 Any
fish
(1) taken in Washington waters or in United States waters off the
coast of Washington, (2) taken from runs of fish that pass through
the Indians' usual and accustomed fishing grounds, and (3) taken by
either members of the Indian tribes that are parties to this litigation,
on the one hand, or by non-Indian citizens of Washington, on the
other hand, shall count against that party's respective share of the
[treaty area] fish.25 °
Lastly, addressing the issues raised in Gillnetters, the Court held that the
Washington State Supreme Court had erred in holding that state Game and
Fisheries Departments were prohibited from complying with the district court's
remedial orders and had erred in holding that the Washington district court
exceeded its authority when it assumed control of treaty-area fisheries.2"'
Under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution,252 state agencies that
are parties to a federal lawsuit may be ordered to implement regulations
designed to enforce a federal court's interpretation under federal law of the
rights of one of the parties. 3 If the agencies are unable to or refuse to
implement the regulations, the federal court has the power to implement them
itself and impose federal enforcement measures to ensure they are followed.
2 54
247. Id. at 688.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id at 689. The Court did not resolve the issue of whether ceremonial and subsistence
treaty fishing have to be given priority over non-treaty fishing during periods of scarcity to carry
out the purposes of the treaties. The Court suggested, however, that conditions of scarcity could
cause the treaty share to exceed fifty percent because a greater-than-fifty-percent share may be
needed when fish are scarce just to fulfill the tribes' ceremonial and subsistence needs.
251. Id. at 695-96.
252. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
253. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 694.
254. Id. at 695-96.
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"Even if those orders may have been erroneous in some respects, all parties
have an unequivocal obligation to obey them while they remain in effect."2"
In Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court endorsed every major aspect of the
district courts' handling of the allocation issue. The Court affirmed that the
fishing clauses reserved to the tribes an implied right to a specific share of
anadromous fish returning to rivers and streams containing customary tribal
fishing sites, not just an equal opportunity to try and catch fish in common with
non-treaty fishers. The Court also affirmed the broad outlines of Judge Boldt's
formula for determining what the tribal share should be: the tribes are entitled
to up to fifty percent of all harvestable fish from runs that pass through or are
destined to pass through traditional tribal fishing grounds, subject to an
equitable adjustment to make up for fish captured offshore by domestic non-
treaty fishers. By specifying that fifty percent is a maximum but not a
minimum share of the resource and that this share is subject to cutbacks in
accordance with future reductions in the tribes' moderate living needs, the
Court made it clear that the tribes' allocation rights are not absolute property
rights and are meant to reserve nothing more than a moderate living for the
tribes. On the question of enforcement, Fishing Vessel established beyond any
doubt that federal courts have authority to require state agencies to enforce the
tribes' allocation rights and to assume direct supervisory control, if necessary,
over treaty-area fisheries for the purpose of enforcing those rights.
V. Habitat Conservation and Restoration: United States v. Washington
(Phase 1)2
56
In the first phase of UnitedStates v. Washington,257 the district court reserved
two contested issues for subsequent trial: whether hatchery fish should be
counted with wild fish among the total number of fish allocable to the tribes25
and whether the right of taking fish incorporates a right to protection against
degradation of treaty fishery habitats.' 9 These issues were considered in the
second phase of United States v. Washington.26 Phase H was decided once in
the district court and three different times in the court of appeals. It ended with
a ruling on the merits on the hatchery fish issue only. The tribes' assertion of
255. Id. at 696.
256. 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985).
257. United States v. Washington (Phase 1), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
258. Id. at 344-45.
259. Id. at 328.
260. Phase I, 759 F.2d at 1355-56; United States v. Washington (Phase I), 506 F. Supp.
187, 191 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
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a habitat conservation right was eventually dismissed on procedural grounds.26'
Although the hatchery fish issue is really a facet of the allocation issue, it is
discussed in this section because it was litigated in Phase II alongside the
habitat issue.
The district court held a bench trial on the hatchery and habitat issues and
announced a ruling on the merits that was favorable to the tribes on both
issues."' In its first hearing of the case, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals also ruled on the merits with respect to both issues, holding
squarely for the tribes on the hatchery issue and partially for the tribes on the
habitat issue.263 Sitting en banc a few months later, the appellate court
withdrew its initial decision, however, and vacated the trial court's ruling on the
habitat issue on grounds that the issue had not been properly before it.2"
Eventually, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Phase 11.265 The final result
of Phase H for the tribes was thus a positive holding on the hatchery issue
(hatchery fish would be counted as part of the sum total of allocable treaty-area
fish) but no holding at all on the habitat issue. After an arduous nine-year
process and four separate decisions, the most controversial and potentially far-
reaching issue in the entire record of litigation over the Stevens Treaties was
left unresolved, and remains unresolved to this day.
Phase II commenced in August 1976 when the United States and the tribes
filed amended and supplemental complaints in Judge Boldt's district court, soon
after the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari in Phase L 266 In their
opening pleadings in Phase II, the tribes and the United States requested
declarations that hatchery-bred fish are included in the allocable fish population
and that the tribes' right of taking fish impliedly incorporates a right to have
treaty fishery habitats protected from human-caused degradation. 267 The tribes
and the United States also asked the court to order further remedies at its
discretion to the extent necessary to safeguard the tribes' rights to conservation
of treaty fishery habitats. 268 The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the
habitat issue in November 1978.269 After the Supreme Court finally affirmed
the tribes' allocation rights in Fishing Vessel, each of the parties filed new
261. Phase I, 759 F.2d at 1357.




266. Id. at 1355-56.
267. Id.; United States v. Washington (Phase fl), 506 F. Supp. 187, 194 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
268. Phase 11, 759 F.2d at 1355-56.
269. Id. at 1356.
[Vol. 31
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/2
No. 1] FISHING RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 79
cross-motions for summary judgment on the hatchery fish issue.270  The
plaintiffs moved again for partial summary judgment on the habitat issue,
asking for a declaration of their rights to protection of fishery habitats but
apparently leaving for trial the question of whether the state had violated these
rights and the question of what remedies, if any, the tribes were entitled to.
271
In September 1980, the district court ruled in favor of the tribes on both of
their motions. Judge William Orrick, who had replaced Judge Boldt on the
bench, held that hatchery fish are "fish" within the meaning of the fishing
clauses and must be included in the tribes' treaty share to fulfill the purposes of
the treaties.272 On the habitat issue, the court held that a right to protection of
treaty fishery habitats is impliedly incorporated in the right of taking fish as
secured by the treaties, and that the state, the United States, and third parties
have a correlative duty "to refrain from degrading the fish habitat to an extent
that would deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs." 2"
At the court's direction, the tribes then filed a proposed order for declaratory
relief on the two main issues, again leaving aside the subsidiary question of
whether the state had actually violated the tribes' habitat conservation rights
and the question of what remedies, if any, the tribes were entitled to.274 In
January 1981, Judge Orrick adopted the tribes' proposed order as an amended
judgment.2 75  Finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact
regarding the parties' motions and that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary
judgment on the hatchery fish issue and partial summary judgment on the
habitat issue, the court decreed, inter alia, that:
1. Hatchery-bred and artificially-propagated fish released into
public waters are "fish" within the meaning of the fishing clause of
each of the Stevens Treaties and consequently are subject to
allocation thereunder in order to effectuate the parties' intent and the
purposes of the fishing clause.
3. The Tribes have an implicitly incorporated right under the
fishing clauses of the Stevens Treaties not to have the fishery habitat
degraded by the actions of man which cause environmental damage
resulting in such a reduction of available harvestable fish that the
270. Id.
271. Id.; see also Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 194.
272. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 197.
273. Id. at 203, 208.
274. United States v. Washington (Phase I), 759 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
275. Id.
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moderate living standard, as implemented through the allocation
orders of the District Court in Phase I, cannot be met.
4. The state has a correlative duty under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution of the United States, independent of the duty of the
United States and of third parties, to refrain from degrading or
authorizing others to degrade the fish habitat to the extent that it
would deprive the Tribes of their moderate living needs, as
implemented through the allocation orders of the District Court in
Phase I.
8. The issue of whether the state has violated the Tribes' [habitat
conservation rights] and has breached its duty to the Tribes and the
issue of what remedies, if any, plaintiffs are entitled to were not
included in the motion for partial summary judgment, have not yet
been presented to the Court, and are not covered by this Amended
Judgment.276
In an attempt to resolve concerns about how the parties would handle
grievances based on alleged violations of the tribes' habitat conservation rights,
the court ordered that the tribes must carry the burden of proving that state
actions proximately cause fishery habitats to be degraded and that the state in
return must carry the burden of showing that such degradation will not affect
the tribes' ability to earn a moderate living from fishing.277 The court noted that
it would be especially difficult for the state to show that a particular instance of
habitat degradation will not impair the tribes' moderate living needs if the tribal
allocation is already at its maximum of fifty percent: "If the treaty allocation of
harvestable fish is at 50 percent, then there is a presumption that the [tribes']
moderate living needs are not being met." '278 The court concluded its January
1981 order by pronouncing, "This Amended Judgment constitutes a final
declaratory judgment and is reviewable as such."27 9
On appeal by the state to the Ninth Circuit, Phase II was heard and re-
decided three different times. The case was heard first by a three-judge panel.
In a decision released in November 1982, the panel affirmed the district court's
declaratory judgment on the hatchery fish issue2"0 but significantly modified it
276. United States v. Washington, Civil No. 9213, at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 1981) (Phase
II amended judgment).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 3.
279. Id.
280. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982).
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with respect to the habitat issue. Reaching the merits but rejecting the district
court's treatment of the habitat issue, the panel held that the treaty right of
taking fish did not incorporate a right to protection of treaty fishery
environments but instead required the state and the tribes to each "take
reasonable steps commensurate with the respective resources and abilities of
each to preserve and enhance the fishery."28'
The panel's ruling was withdrawn when a majority of active judges on the
Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.282 Initially, the en banc court
overturned the panel's decision and dismissed the state's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.283 The court reasoned that the district court's Amended Judgment
was not final since it granted only partial summary judgment on the habitat
issue and apparently reserved for trial the subsidiary issues of whether the state
had actually breached its habitat protection duties and what remedies, if any, to
which the tribes were entitled. 284 Because the plaintiff's 1976 supplemental
complaint had included these subsidiary issues and the district court had not yet
decided them, the en banc court at first concluded that the Amended Judgment
was not reviewable - despite the district court's characterization of it as "a
final declaratory judgment ... reviewable as such.
285
A majority of active judges on the Ninth Circuit still had deep misgivings
about the outcome of the case. The state petitioned for rehearing, and the court
again withdrew its opinion. In its third and final decision, sitting en banc and
writing per curiam, the court retreated from its previous position and held that
the state's appeal of the district court's Amended Judgment was within its
jurisdiction after all.286 The court decided that the district court's order was
final and reviewable because it granted the full relief sought by the plaintiffs
and completely resolved the tribes' primary claims in Phase II.217 That the
order failed to resolve two of the issues raised in the plaintiffs' supplemental
complaint did not detract from its finality under the court's new analysis
because these issues had been expressly excluded by the plaintiffs from the
scope of the order.28 After revising its analysis and deciding that the Amended
Judgment was final and reviewable, the en banc court affirmed the district
281. Id. at 1381.
282. United States v. Washington (Phase 11), 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983).
283. Judith Constans, The Environmental Right to Habitat Protection: A Sohappy Solution,
61 WASH. L. REv. 731, 734 n.27 (1986).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. United States v. Washington (Phase 11), 759 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
287. Id.
288. Id.
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court's declaratory judgment on the hatchery fish issue but vacated its
declaratory judgment on the habitat issue.289
In its third and final decision, the Ninth Circuit never reached the merits of
the tribes' contention that the right of taking fish incorporates a right to
conservation of fishery environments. Instead, it rested its reversal of this part
of the district court's ruling on procedural grounds. Declaratory relief on the
habitat issue, the court reasoned, was inappropriate because under the
circumstances it neither resolved the parties' legal relations nor provided them
with relief from uncertainty and controversy.290 In its third and final opinion,
the court concluded that the Phase 11 litigation was not a proper forum for
entering declaratory relief on the habitat issue. Entering a declaratory judgment
in the absence of a litigated dispute over a specific, tangible instance of human-
caused fishery habitat degradation, without the clear factual record that such a
dispute would provide, the court reasoned, was "contrary to the exercise of
sound judicial discretion. 291
It serves neither the needs of the parties, nor thejurisprudence of the
court, nor the interests of the public for the judiciary to employ the
declaratory judgment procedure to announce legal rules imprecise
in definition and uncertain in dimension. Precise resolution, not
general admonition, is the function of declaratory relief. These
necessary predicates for a declaratory judgment have not been met
with respect to the environmental issue in this case.292
The district court's declaratory judgment on the hatchery fish issue,
according to the Ninth Circuit's final opinion, did not suffer from the
procedural infirmities that tainted its declaratoryjudgment on the habitat issue.
Because the decree regarding hatchery fish served to "clarifly] and settl[e] the
legal relations of the parties and afford[ed] relief from a precise dispute
identified in the proceedings," the court viewed declaratory judgment as an
appropriate mechanism for handling the hatchery fish issue.293
At trial, and again before the appellate court, the state argued that first-
generation hatchery fish belonged to the state and should be excluded from the
tribes' share of each season's harvest.294 If accepted by the court, the state's
289. Id. at 1355.
290. Id. at 1357.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1357-58.
294. Id. at 1359.
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approach would have reduced the tribes' allocation to a much smaller share of
available fish, consisting only of wild fish and naturalized descendants of
hatchery fish.295 Rejecting these arguments, the court found that equitable
considerations supported the tribes' contention that returning hatchery-reared
fish should be counted equally in the tribes' allocation with returning wild and
naturalized fish. 96
The court cited four considerations that weighed in favor of affirming the
district court's declaratory judgment on the hatchery fish issue: "(1) the lack of
State ownership of the fish once released; (2) the lack of any unjust enrichment
of the Tribes; (3) the fact that hatchery fish and natural fish are not
distinguished for other purposes; and (4) the mitigating function of the hatchery
fish programs." '297 Focusing on the last of these factors, the court concluded,
"For the Tribes to bear the full burden of the decline caused by their non-Indian
neighbors without sharing the replacement achieved through the hatcheries,
would be an inequity and inconsistent with the Treaty.1
298
The full outcome of Phase II was a disappointment to all parties. The state
appealed the decision, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari in November
1985.299 The tribes were happy to win a victory on the hatchery fish issue, and
the state was certainly relieved that the district court's judgment on the habitat
issue had been vacated. Still, each party had strong reasons for wanting the
court to decide the habitat issue on the merits. By the late 1970s, with the
allocation issue largely resolved, environmental degradation had become by far
the single greatest threat to treaty fisheries. The tribes wanted standing to ask
the court to enjoin specific instances of fisheries habitat degradation. An
adverse ruling on the merits of their habitat claim would have posed a setback
for them, but it would have clarified their legal position in future lawsuits and
negotiations over fisheries habitats. Similarly, Washington and the United
States wanted the court to rule on the merits of the tribes' claim because
uncertainty and confusion about the scope of treaty rights made it difficult to
move forward on countless routine projects that posed a threat to fishery
habitats - projects such as timber harvests, dam operations, irrigation
diversions, and waterfront developments.
Given the important interests at stake on both sides and the significant
consequences of a final ruling on the merits of the tribes' habitat rights claim,
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1359-60.
297. Id. (citing Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)).
298. Id. at 1360.
299. Washington v. United States, 474 U.S. 994 (1985).
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the Ninth Circuit's decision to vacate the district court's ruling on the habitat
issue is puzzling. The appellate court seems to have concluded that the
consequences of upholding a treaty right to habitat conservation were too
uncertain to warrant the action taken by the district court; the tribes' failure to
ground its pleadings in specific instances of human-caused habitat degradation
made declaratory judgment inappropriate.
Declaratory relief should be denied when it will neither serve a
useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue
nor terminate the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty
and controversy faced by the parties.... Legal rules of general
applicability are announced when their consequences are known and
understood in the case before the court, not when the subject parties
and the court giving judgment are left to guess at their meaning.3"'
The court's conclusion is puzzling because it seems to contradict the position
taken by both sides on the importance of a ruling on the merits of the tribes'
claim. Both the tribes and the state seem to have assumed and expected at the
outset of Phase II that a declaration on the tribes' asserted habitat conservation
rights would clarify and settle certain essential legal relations between the
parties, just as earlier declarations by the court had clarified and settled some
of the parties' other legal relations. Although the conflict over habitat
protection was not marked by physical confrontations between the parties, as
previous disputes had been, Phase II was nevertheless litigated under a shared
belief that the conflict over habitat had serious practical ramifications, and that
a declaratory judgment would help resolve ongoing tensions between the
parties.
As Judge Nelson pointed out in a dissenting opinion, all of the necessary
conditions for the use of the declaratory judgment procedure were present in
Phase II. First, the facts showed that there was "a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratoryjudgment., 30 ' The tribes alleged
that state officials were under a duty to prevent human-caused degradation of
treaty fishery environments and were breaching this duty by carrying out and/or
authorizing projects that damaged the spawning, rearing, and migratory habitats
of treaty-area fish. The state countered that it was under no such duty because
the tribes had no rights to fisheries habitat protection. These conflicting claims
300. Phase I, 759 F.2d at 1357.
301. Id. at 1363 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Md. Casualty
Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
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reflected a controversy whose resolution would have immediate, tangible
consequences for the parties. Second, a declaratory judgment resolving the
habitat issue would have served a useful purpose by clarifying and settling the
legal relationships between the tribes and the state. The majority's claim to the
contrary is simply disingenuous. A declaratory judgment on the habitat issue
would have settled the central question of whether treaty-area fisheries must be
protected from human-caused environmental degradation.
The State needs to know whether [the tribes' asserted right] exists
in order to make intelligent decisions about future development in
the treaty area. The same is true with respect to the United
States .... If the right does exist to some extent, the State and the
United States must take it into account in their development
decisions. Likewise, the treaty fishermen need to know where they
stand after the Supreme Court's decision in [Fishing Vessel]. They
are entitled to an answer concerning the treaty their forebears
accepted." 2
Lastly, as Judge Nelson argued, declaratory judgment on the habitat issue
was proper - even though it left undecided certain questions about the scope
of the state's duties - because it resolved at least one significant issue in
contention between the parties. The Declaratory Judgment Act3 3 authorizes the
use of declaratory judgment regardless of whether doing so leaves some of the
issues at stake in a given case open for future litigation.3 4 The Ninth Circuit
majority used an artificially inflated standard to reject the district court's
resolution of the habitat issue. In reality, the application of declaratory
judgment in Phase II could have resolved all questions about the scope of the
parties' treaty rights and duties concerning fishery environments only if it had
held that the tribes had absolutely no right to habitat conservation. A judgment
more favorable to the tribes, even one only slightly more favorable, would leave
open the possibility of future litigation and would therefore be, to some extent,
"uncertain in dimension." This alone would not make the procedure improper,
however; declaratory judgment remains proper "as long as it resolves a
significant disputed issue."3 5
302. Id. at 1364 (citations omitted).
303. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
304. Phase 11, 759 F.2d at 1364.
305. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Harris v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 569 F.2d 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1978)); 6A JAMES WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 57.08[4] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1983) (1938)).
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The procedural flaw the appellate court purported to find in the district
court's handling of the habitat issue seems to have been little more than a
pretext for overturning a controversial ruling without having to reach the merits
of the tribes' claim. By vacating the district court's judgment on the habitat
issue, the Ninth Circuit erased a decision that carried potentially dramatic
consequences for economically vital extractive industries and politically
powerful resource-dependent interest groups. The economic backbone of the
Pacific Northwest is comprised of industries that depend on the same natural
resources that salmon depend on: rivers, streams, and forests. These industries
rely on activities that modify or destroy the natural watershed conditions that
sustain salmon.3"
If the appellate court had upheld Judge Orrick's decree, the tribes would
have gained a strong legal foothold for challenging a wide array of watershed-
affecting policies and projects. Such a decision would have fundamentally
altered the legal framework of natural resource policy-making throughout the
treaty area. Although the appellate court tried to mask its reasoning in a theory
about the province and role of the declaratory judgment procedure, it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that its decision was guided mainly by prudential
considerations, and that the court found fault, not with the district court's use
of declaratory judgment per se, but with the outcome of its use of declaratory
judgment. The majority even seemed to admit this. "Declaratory relief should
be denied," they wrote, "when prudential considerations counsel against its use
and the decision to grant declaratory relief should always be made with
reference to the public interest.,
30 7
If the Phase II district court was correct - if the right to take fish impliedly
incorporates a right to have treaty fishery habitats protected to the extent needed
for the tribes to earn a moderate living from fishing, and if this right conveys
a correlative duty on the part of the United States and successor governments
to conserve and, where necessary, restore these habitats - then the federal
government and treaty-area states have, in countless instances, long been
306. Industrial logging, for instance, relies on clearcuts, which cause erosion, eliminate
shade, and elevate water temperatures. Real estate development along streams eliminates shade
and elevates water temperatures. Utilities companies and power-intensive industries such as
aluminum manufacturers rely on hydropower generated at dams, which destroy spawning,
rearing, and migratory habitats. Barge companies on the Columbia and lower Snake rely on
slack water created by dams. Farmers in eastern Washington and Idaho rely on irrigation-
diversions from tributaries of the Columbia and Snake, leaving insufficient water for spawning
salmon and leaving millions ofjuvenile salmon stranded in ditches each year. Industrial mining
destroys the gravel beds that salmon rely on for spawning.
307. Phase II, 759 F.2d at 1357 (citations omitted).
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systematically in violation of the treaties. Breaches of federal and state
governments' duties to conserve fishery environments are evident in most
treaty-area watersheds. Treaty-area rivers and streams have been drastically
and continuously modified by dams, logging, grazing, mining, pollution, and
development. The destruction of fishery environments is especially evident
along the middle and upper reaches of the Columbia and throughout the Snake
River Basin. Here, treaty fisheries have collapsed under the cumulative
demands of industry and agriculture. In 1991 at congressional hearings on
petitions to list once-abundant Snake River salmon runs under the Endangered
Species Act, fisheries biologist Ed Chaney warned that salmon recovery efforts
on the Snake and its tributaries would be pointless unless the hydropower
system was fixed to allow safe passage of juvenile salmon? s
According to the region's fishery agencies, the dams are responsible
for more than 95% of all man-caused mortality of the petitioned
Snake River salmon runs. If the dams are not fixed, all past, present
and future investments in habitat and hatcheries, and the enormous
social and economic cost of devastated fisheries and dependent
economies, will be for nothing. The fish will eventually be lost.
3 9
If the right to take fish includes a right to protection of treaty fishery habitats,
then these dams and reservoirs form a series of ongoing treaty violations.31
Twenty years after Phase II, the habitat issue remains undecided. Two
decades after the appellate court's third and final decision, the tribes are in
basically the same legal position they occupied at the outset of Phase JI except
that today they enjoy a recognized right to having hatchery fish included among
their share of the fishery. At any point during the past two decades, the tribes
could have filed suit to reassert their habitat protection rights and enjoin specific
308. Testimony of Ed Cheney Before Congressional Oversight Hearing, Senate Committee
on Appropriations, Portland, Oregon Field Hearing (May 2, 1991) (on file with the American
Indian Law Review).
309. Id.
310. According to a study published in 1986 by the Northwest Power Planning Council, fifty
to eighty percent of the Basin's aboriginal salmon runs have been permanently lost as a result
of dams and reservoirs. ROCKY BARKER, SAVING ALL THE PARTS: RECONCILING ECONOMICS
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 93 (1993). All dam-related losses affect salmon runs
originating in or above Columbia Basin treaty-area waterways. Every salmon run destroyed by
Columbia and Snake River dams has thus been a loss to treaty fishers. See also NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST 226-37 (1996); LISAMIGHErro & WESLEYJ. EBEL, SAVING THE SALMON:
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS EFFORTS TO PROTECT ANADROMOUS
FISH ON THE COLUMBIA AND SNAKE RIVERS 81-92 (1994).
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instances of habitat degradation. Instead, rightly or wrongly, they have focused
all their efforts on negotiations with the states and the federal government. In
the Columbia Basin, these negotiations have secured tighter restrictions on non-
treaty fishing and increased production at upriver hatcheries. Negotiations have
not, however, addressed conflicts over habitat protection and habitat restoration.
The most recent management agreement for Columbia Basin fisheries contains
detailed hatchery production quotas and detailed provisions for harvest but no
provisions for conservation and restoration.3 1' The dams are as lethal as ever.
The tribes, however, seem to have accepted inaction on the habitat issue in
exchange for favorable agreements on harvest and hatcheries.
For tribes whose fishing grounds are in watersheds where habitat restoration
is essential to reviving treaty fisheries, this trade-off will ultimately be of little
value. Without reinstatement of natural flow conditions along significant
portions of the mainstem Columbia and lower Snake, the Basin's tribes will
eventually lose their fisheries. Increased hatchery production and restrictions
on non-treaty fishing will never be enough, by themselves, to restore mid-
Columbia salmon runs to numbers large enough and consistent enough to
sustain viable treaty fisheries. Recognizing this, the tribes' own fisheries
restoration plan has long called for reservoir drawdowns at each of the four
lower Snake dams and at John Day Dam on the mainstem Columbia.312 The
tribes' plan, however, is merely aspirational; it carries no legal force. Until
their rights to healthy fishery habitats are fully recognized, the tribes will stay
on the margins of treaty-area resource policy-making. Their harvest rights give
them a voice in setting hatchery policies and regulating what is left of their
fisheries. The greatest impact on most treaty-area fisheries, however, is caused
not by hatchery and harvest policies but by policies on dams, timber harvest,
riparian area development, livestock grazing, pollution, and the like. Without
recognized rights to habitat protection, the tribes are powerless to change the
status quo in precisely the areas where change needs to happen for their
fisheries to survive.
Resource policies that consistently favor power production over fish
production and industry and agriculture over natural river and stream conditions
will lead to a final collapse of treaty fisheries in the Columbia Basin and
elsewhere. Before this happens, the Basin's treaty tribes and other Northwest
treaty tribes might conclude that they have little to lose by reasserting their
habitat rights in court. To avoid any hint of the procedural shortcomings of the
311. 2005-2007 Interim Management Agreement for Upriver Chinook, Sockeye, Steelhead,
Coho, & White Sturgeon 5-31, 41-60 (n.d.).
312. COLUMBIA RIVER INTER-TRImAL FISH COMM'N, supra note 5, at 29.
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tribes' Phase II habitat claim, new litigation should be directed at specific
instances of human-caused degradation, and the consequences of a declaratory
judgment should be stipulated. As shown in the district court's Phase 11
holding, the tribes have a strong case. The canons of treaty construction and the
Supreme Court's reading of the fishing clauses in all the major cases, from
Winans through Fishing Vessel, provide strong support for the conclusion that
the right to take fish impliedly incorporates a right to protection of fishery
environments from human-caused degradation.
In Fishing Vessel, of course, the Court was faced with the issue of whether
a state has a duty to regulate the activity offishing to ensure treaty fishers a fair
share of the harvest. The habitat issue, by contrast, is whether the state also has
a duty to regulate other types offishery-affecting activities, activities that do not
involve directly taking fish but that deprive treaty fishers just the same of their
fair share of the fishery. From the tribes' point of view, the treaty share of
harvestable fish is a share of the Basin's fishery as a whole. The fishery as a
whole includes both mature fish taken directly by fishers and fish taken
prematurely through the destruction or modification of fishery habitats by
dams, timber harvests, waterfront development, pollution, etc. While the
habitat issue is different from the harvest allocation issue, Justice Stevens'
reasoning in Fishing Vessel is equally applicable to both.
In numerous cases stretching back to the Marshall Trilogy,31 3 including the
main Stevens Treaty cases, the Supreme Court has relied on three principal
canons of construction to guide its reading of the rights and duties established
through treaties between the United States and Indian tribes: treaties should be
liberally construed in favor of the tribes;314 treaty provisions should be
interpreted as tribal representatives would have understood them at treaty
time; 3 5 and treaties should be interpreted in a manner that promotes their
central purposes.31 6 In Fishing Vessel, the Court reasoned that allowing the
state to apportion the lion's share of harvestable treaty-area fish to non-treaty
fishers through discriminatory fishing regulations was inconsistent with treaty
provisions as understood by tribal representatives at treaty time. In Justice
313. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
314. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
at 515).
315. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n (Fishing
Vessel), 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905)
(citations omitted).
316. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679-88; Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
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Stevens' analysis, the fishing clauses were understood by the tribes as reserving
not merely the right to go fishing - to dip their nets in the water - but the
right, more substantially, to sustain a moderate living from fishing.317 Because
securing their customary livelihood was, for the tribes, the central purpose of
the fishing clauses, Justice Stevens reasoned that enforcement of the treaties
requires restrictions on non-treaty fishing to allow fish to reach treaty fishing
grounds in sufficient numbers to sustain viable commercial treaty fisheries.
The same reasoning applies to the habitat issue. At treaty time, all parties
seem to have accepted that the treaties obligated the United States to refrain
from interfering with the tribes' use of treaty-area fisheries for nourishment,
commerce, and cultural and spiritual sustenance. At treaty time, the parties
assumed that threats to treaty-area fisheries would come in the form of non-
Indian settlers crowding tribal members out of their customary fishing sites."'
It is unlikely that any of the parties envisioned the possibility of treaty fisheries
being monopolized through over-fishing or habitat destruction. Changes in
circumstances, however, and the emergence of new, post-treaty human-caused
threats to the region's fisheries, do not alter the basic promise that the tribes
have always understood to be enshrined in the treaties: that the United States -
and, if necessary, successor states - would, to the best of their abilities, protect
the tribes' rights to use treaty-area fisheries for food, commerce, and cultural
and spiritual sustenance.
The tribes believed that in surrendering their territories they were gaining
protection against real and potential human-caused threats to their fishery-based
way of life - threats posed by American settlement of the region. One
hundred fifty years later, as courts discern the contemporary meaning of the
fishing clauses, it is immaterial whether these threats come in a form recognized
at treaty time or in a form that did not emerge until a few decades later. As the
court held in Fishing Vessel, the state is prohibited from allowing the tribes'
317. Justice Stevens cited the district court's findings on this point:
At the treaty council the United States negotiators promised, and the Indians
understood, that the Yakimas would forever be able to continue the same off-
reservation food gathering and fishing practices as to time, place, method, species,
and extent as they had or were exercising. The Yakimas relied on these promises
and they formed a basic and material part of the treaty and of the Indians'
understanding of the meaning of the treaty.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667-68 (citations omitted).
318. Justice Stevens noted that "contemporaneous documents make it clear that [U.S.
negotiators] recognized the vital importance of the fisheries to the Indians and wanted to protect
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share of treaty-area fish to be taken by non-treaty fishers because doing so
would deprive the tribes of precisely what the treaties were supposed to have
secured. The state and the federal government should likewise be prohibited
from allowing the tribes' share of treaty-area fish to be taken by other non-
treaty resource users, whether timber companies, dam operators, mining
companies, farmers, or real estate developers. The Fishing Vessel rationale for
requiring the state to restrict non-treaty fishing applies readily to the problem
of habitat degradation, so readily that Judge Orrick concluded that Fishing
Vessel "all but resolved the environmental issue.
319
Fishing Vessel held that the state has a duty to restrict non-treaty fishing to
the extent needed to allow a fair share of treaty-area fish to reach tribal fishing
grounds. Without such restrictions, the Court held, the tribes' right of taking
fish would be meaningless.320 If degradation of fishery environments continues,
"the right to take fish would eventually be reduced to the right to dip one's net
into the water... and bring it out empty."32'
Millions of young salmon destined to return as adults to treaty-area
waterways are "taken" each year by forest- and river-dependent industries.
They are smothered by silt from clearcuts, stranded in irrigation ditches,
shredded in turbines, and gobbled by exotic predators that thrive in reservoirs.
Tribal fisheries no longer exist in many treaty-area watersheds. The right to
take fish is meaningless where there are no fish or where the only remaining
fish are on the endangered species list. Habitat destruction by industry and
agriculture cuts off the tribes' fishing rights more directly and irreparably than
discriminatory regulations and excessive non-treaty fishing. Judge Orrick
redeemed the tribes' rights to take fish and gave them a true practical
significance by extending the Fishing Vessel holding to the habitat issue. His
judgment should not have been overturned. Future courts that decide the
habitat issue should follow his precedent. The right to take fish incorporates a
right of having fish to be taken.
VI. Conclusion
If the tribes elect to relitigate, and the courts rely on long-established canons
of treaty construction and the logic followed in previous cases, then the habitat
conservation issue should be resolved in favor of the tribes. To the tribes, the
319. United States v. Washington (Phase I), 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
(citation omitted).
320. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
321. Phase lI, 506 F. Supp. 187 at 203.
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central purpose of reserving the right to take fish was to ensure that after ceding
their territories they would be able to maintain traditional fishing-based
economies and cultures. Healthy fisheries, access to fishing sites, and a share
of harvestable fish are essential to fishing-based economies and cultures.
In the face of intense controversy, courts have affirmed the tribes' rights of
access and harvest allocation. As courts have recognized, exercise of the right
to take fish at customary fishing sites requires, at a minimum, access to those
3223sites"' and fish at those sites available to be taken. 3 For fish to be available
at customary fishing sites, two conditions must exist: a meaningful share of
harvestable fish destined to pass tribal fishing sites must be allowed to actually
reach those sites, and the portion of the fishery that spawns above tribal fishing
grounds must be relatively healthy. Specific treaty-area environmental
conditions must be maintained, and, if necessary, restored, to support a treaty
fishery capable of meeting the tribes' moderate living needs.
The central purpose of the fishing clauses cannot be promoted unless the
clauses are read as reserving rights to fisheries habitat protection as well as
rights of access and allocation. Each set of rights - access, allocation, and
habitat conservation - is essential to the web of values that sustains the way
of life reserved by the tribes through the treaties. Denying these rights would
be inconsistent with the central purpose of the fishing clauses and would
deviate sharply from the reasoning that has guided fishing clause jurisprudence
for over a century.
Judicial affirmation of the tribes' fisheries habitat conservation rights, and
of correlative state and federal responsibilities to protect fishery environments,
would extend legal recognition to the last major judicially unrecognized
prerequisite to exercising the right of taking fish, and would complete the long
process of making the law consistent with what the treaties promised.
322. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
323. Sohappyv. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969); United States v. Washington
(Phase 1), 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d
676, 688 (9th Cir. 1975); Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679.
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